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ABSTRACT
Incarceration is one of the most extreme exercises of state power. For the past
twenty-five years the rates at which states have been locking up their residents have been
growing at a distressing pace. While violent crime rates have been declining, arrest rates
for lower-level crimes have been steadily rising. Two new indices are developed to
explain the relationship between lower-level crime and violent crime—the punitive
severity index (PSI) and the punitive progression index (PPI). The PSI is the ratio of lowlevel crime to violent crime, a static indicator of punitiveness, while the PPI is a measure
of the rate of growth towards or away from a more punitive approach to law enforcement.
The PSI and probation rates are two important factors for predicting incarceration rates,
explaining 98.6% of the variation in incarceration rates.
Hierarchical modeling was used to test hypotheses about the influence of the PSI,
the PPI, and other state-level contextual variables on sentence length. At the individual
level, the model suggests the race of the inmate has some, though nonsignificant,
influence on sentence length. At the state level, PPI is significant (p = .011) for predicting
states’ average sentence length. Type of state probation system oversight, either judicial
or executive, also significantly affected length of sentence, with judicial oversight
associated with shorter periods of incarceration.
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Chapter One: Introduction
A Case
On Thursday June 18, 2009, Harvard University Professor Henry Lewis Gates Jr.
was arrested in his home in Boston, near Harvard Square, handcuffed, and booked for
disorderly conduct (Jan, 2009).
Quite unremarkable in some regards and extraordinary in other ways, this
incident provides a backdrop for this research study. Unremarkable because the arrest of
an individual (even in their own home) for disorderly conduct is not inconsistent with the
approach to crime control this country has been experiencing over the past thirty years
(Coffee, 1991). Additionally, the fact that Professor Gates is a black male increased the
likelihood of his arrest for any infraction (Thompson, 2008).
What occurred after his arrest represents the more interesting aspect of this case.
The charge against Professor Gates was dropped, this despite the insistence from the
arresting officer that it was an appropriate arrest (Zezima & Goodnough, 2009). At no
point did anyone allege that the arresting officer fabricated the details of the incident or
was otherwise negligent in his duties. Indeed, the arrest report appears on its face to
outline just such an infraction as Professor Gates was charged with, disorderly conduct
(Cambridge Police Department Incident Report #9005127, July 16, 2009; for
convenience provided in Appendix A).
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Not only was the charge against Professor Gates dropped but U.S. President
Barack Obama was involved in the fray and hosted a beer and chat session with the
Professor and arresting officer at the White House (Wallsten & Dorning, 2009). Professor
Gates is not like most of the individuals that are caught up in the criminal justice system
in the United States every day—his charge was dropped and he went on to some celebrity
status. Along with such luminaries as Meryl Streep and Stephen Colbert, he appeared on
the PBS television show Faces of America on February 10, 2010. Additionally, Gates
donated the handcuffs used in the arrest to the Smithsonian, these having been given to
him by the arresting officer (Solomon, 2010). For those citizens who have been arrested
in handcuffs, this magnanimous act—gifting Gates the handcuffs he was arrested in—on
the part of law enforcement may have appeared surreal. The dropping of the ‘good arrest’
charge was a highly unusual event. While a study looking at the factors involved in the
differential treatment of Professor Gates would prove interesting, the impact would be
minimal as so few others will find themselves in similar situations. This research study
focuses on what would have happened to the Professor had he not been pulled from the
jaws of justice; if he had become another statistic in the war on crime that has been
waged against U.S. citizens since the 1970s (Beale, 2003). Specifically, the problem
addressed in this study is the expanding inclusion of minor bad behaviors in the states’
definition of crimes and the corrections systems response to this phenomenon. Such a
study will have a much greater impact since many more individuals are involved in the
corrections system—specifically in the year of Professor Gate’s arrest, about 7.3 million
people, or roughly 1 in every 31 citizens (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2010).
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Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this research study was, first, to develop two indices measuring
the trend in state propensity to define crime downward—a trend noted by numerous
authors (see, e.g., Coffee, 1991; Coleman, Sim, Tombs, & Whyte, 2009; Higgins, 1999;
Levitt, 1996; Lynch & Sabol, 1997; Richards & Ross, 2001; Welch, 2005)—using data
collected over a ten year period, and to provide preliminary validation evidence regarding
the indices, and second, to analyze the impact of this trend to define crime downward and
other state level variables on penal policies as measured by sentence length for those
incarcerated by each state. Such an analysis will provide an objective measure of the
trend in the state governments’ approach to crime, enforcement, and corrections in the
U.S., allow for better-informed state policy makers, and reveal the source of much of the
increase in incarceration rates experienced by states across the U.S. This study used an
inmate survey response database compiled by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, a
government agency, for data on inmate sentence length and other inmate level variables.
This study used data from male inmates only due to the large difference in average length
of sentence by gender (males 15.89 years, females 12.74 years) and research suggesting
that females are processed through the criminal justice system differently than males
(Britt, 2000; Crow & Johnson, 2008; Weidner, Frase, & Schultz, 2005).The methodology
employed was ordinary least squares regression and multilevel linear modeling. The
models included important incarceration variables for each subject (inmate) and state
variables that may be associated with certain punishment policies. Of specific interest
was the influence of race and socioeconomic factors on sentence length for the
individuals incarcerated. At the state level, variables of interest include the arrest rate for
3

lesser level crimes (including disorderly conduct), the arrest rate for violent crimes,
probation rate, and percent blacks in the state population. Additionally, at the state level a
variable was constructed to reflect the type of probation system oversight (judicial or
executive). The dependent variable was the time to which an inmate was sentenced, as
measured in years.
Rationale for the Study
Most current research on national imprisonment analyzes the rate of incarceration
(per 100,000) by state (Greenberg & West, 2001). While incarceration rate is important
and does vary by state, alone it will not capture the true measure of states’ punishment
policies. If, for example, a state sends most incarcerated residents to prison for three
years, that particular state may be said to be more punitive than one that sends most of
their residents to prison for one year, assuming approximately equal seriousness of
crimes.
Some studies have used the binary variable of whether or not an individual is
sentenced to prison for a year or longer as the dependent variable to study the variation
from state to state (Wang & Mears, 2009). This approach, however, will not include what
is likely a very important consideration for those incarcerated: For exactly how long?
Many studies have already identified the impact of race and poverty on state
imprisonment rates; none have studied the association between lesser crime and violent
crime as a predictor of incarceration (Steen & Bandy, 2007; Weidner et al., 2005).
This research study shed light on the relationship between certain state law
enforcement practices (level 2 variables) and imprisoned residents’ personal
characteristics (level 1 variables), and the utility of these variables in predicting length of
4

incarceration. Although multilevel linear modeling is not new as a methodology for
analyzing justice data, it had not been applied to inmate survey responses with a focus on
examining inmate level and state level covariates.
The amount spent on corrections by all U.S. states exceeded $47 billion in 2008,
with $9 out of every $10 going toward prison budgets (Moore, 2009). With little
understanding of why incarceration rates continue to rise year after year despite decreases
in rates of serious crime, states continue to allocate large parts of their budgets to
corrections. State budgets are now being squeezed as revenues have declined (McNichol
& Johnson, 2010). This research study provides needed insight into the relationships
among state policing activities and ever increasing corrections spending.
Theory and Research Hypotheses
In this research study the focus was on identifying factors that help to explain, in a
linear fashion, variation in sentencing lengths by individual inmate characteristics (level
1). Also of interest was the degree to which state variables can account for the variation
in sentencing lengths (level 2). Using the arrest of Professor Gates and the more likely
outcome for him (probation) as a mechanism to view the criminal justice system, this
study examines the most common crimes to be charged (disorderly conduct is the second
most frequent), how these lesser crimes have been met with increasing police action (a
downward defining of crime), the likelihood of entering a plea of guilty (90% of all
criminal cases are resolved with such a plea), the sentencing structure, and how all of
these factors impact the sentencing imposed by states. The analysis is structured to enable
a simultaneous look at both of these levels of variables, hence the use of multilevel
modeling, also known as hierarchical linear modeling (HLM).
5

Hypothesis 1: U.S. probation rates explain a significant proportion of the variation
in incarceration rates and are a better predictor of incarceration rates than other
corrections-related variables including various crime rates.
Hypothesis 2: Both the education level (as a surrogate measure for socioeconomic
level) and race of the incarcerated are significant level 1 predictors of sentence length.
Hypothesis 3: The ten-year growth in the ratio of lower-level to violent crimes
(the punitive progression index), the ten-year average ratio of lower-level crime to violent
crime (ten-year average punitive severity index), the type of probation (executive or
judicial oversight), and percent of blacks in the state are significant level 2 predictors of
states’ incarceration sentencing lengths.
Hypothesis 4: The ratio of number of lesser crimes to number of more serious
crimes is significantly correlated with probation and incarceration rates and significant in
a model to predict incarceration in the presence of probation.
Dissertation Overview
This introductory Chapter presented the case of Professor Gates, which serves as
a contextual reference point throughout this research study. Additionally, some topics
associated with penal system policies were introduced and research hypotheses to be
tested were delineated.
Chapter Two further develops the background for this study with a review of
current literature as it relates to the use of variables, both state and individual levels, to
predict such criminal policy variables as incarceration rates, sentencing structure, and
imprisonment variation by race and socioeconomic levels. Additionally, Chapter Two
places this research study in the context of similar studies.
6

Chapter Three addresses the methodology used in this research study with an
emphasis on sampling design, metric development, variable selection, and statistical
analysis. Multilevel modeling is described and validated as appropriate for this study. The
findings of this study are presented in Chapter Four. The final chapter, Chapter Five,
provides a discussion of the findings, conclusions drawn, limitations of the study, and
implications for future research and policy.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review
Incarceration and Crime Rates
The United States has been experiencing an unprecedented growth in
imprisonment of its citizens over the past thirty years (Austin, Bruce, Carroll, McCall, &
Richards, 2001; Costelloe, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2009; Hanser, 2010). Incarceration has
reached the highest level in U.S. history with no sign that things will be changing
(Lawson, 2004). Of those citizens born in 1974, there was a 1% chance of incarceration;
5.2% chance for those born in 1991, and if nothing changes the probability of spending
some time in prison for those born in 2001 will be 6.6% (11.3% for males). In 2001, 17%
of all black males were currently or formerly incarcerated (Bonczar, 2003). From the
mid- 1920s to the 1970s incarceration rates held steady at about 110 per 100,000. As of
2001, the rate was 478 per 100,000 and if jailed prisoners were included it rises to 699
(Beale, 2003; Lawson, 2004). This represents the highest incarceration rate in Western
nations. According to Beale (2003), in 2001 the rates in these other nations ranged
between 125 per 100,000 in the United Kingdom to 60 per 100,000 in Sweden. As of
year-end 2008, the U.S. rate was 754 per 100,000 (Glaze & Bonczar, 2009).
The U.S. locks up its citizens at a rate five to eight times that of most developed
countries (Mauer, 1999). This unprecedented growth in incarceration is the result of
sentencing reform. The targets of the get tough on crime laws were the dangerous
offenders but the result of the sentencing reform was to greatly increase the population of
8

non-violent prisoners (Lynch & Sabol, 1997). With 5% of the world population, the U.S.
has 25% of the world’s prisoners. In the U.S. in the past 25 years, incarceration rates have
increased 500% (Lawson, 2004) and most tough on crime policies adopted during the last
25 years were done so without concern for the fiscal and social cost (Chen, 2008).
The percent of those tagged as offenders with strong connections to mainstream
social organizations such as labor markets and education systems has increased
dramatically (Lynch & Sabol, 1997). Professor Gates would have been just such an
offender and would have added to the increase in non-violent ‘criminals’ swept up in the
tough on crime policies.
The increases in sentencing have not brought about the planned outcomes (Cullen,
Gilbert, & Cullen, 1983). Crime rates have gone down, or in some cases remained stable
over the past twenty years (Blumstein, 1998). America’s criminal justice system is
“remarkably ineffective, absurdly expensive, grossly inhumane and riddled with
discrimination” (Rothman, 1995, p. 29). States are increasingly generous in their use of
incarceration (Greenberg & West, 2001). Over time, changes in sanctioning policies are
unlikely to bring about significant changes in crime rates (Tonry & Farrington, 1995). No
association between measures of crime rates and measures of arrest rates has been found
significant (Chamlin & Meyer, 2009). Rising incarceration rates over the past thirty years
cannot be explained by an associated rise in crime rates (Carroll & Cornell, 1985;
Marvell & Moody, 1994; Sorensen & Stemen, 2002). This increase is not likely to be due
to changes in offender behavior (Padfield & Maruna, 2006).
If the sentencing policies worked, crime should have fallen as a consequence of
harsher penalties, but it did not (Austin et al., 2001). A study by Mauer (1999) revealed
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that under California’s three strikes to a habitual criminal life sentence, in nine of the ten
largest cities a reduction in crime would have occurred without this policy. Tough on
crime laws are the reason for the tremendous increases in both incarceration and
corrections (Altheide & Coyle, 2006). Economic inequalities have had a strong indirect
effect on incarceration rates; levels of crime are insufficient to explain the variation in
these rates (Arvanites & Asher, 1995). Tough sentencing laws such as the three strikes
policies have not reduced crime (Chen, 2008).
A Marxist view would suggest the penal policies, specifically the changes
witnessed over the past thirty years in the U.S. are developed and enforced to control the
poor and disadvantaged (Garland, 1996). The increase in incarceration has less to do with
crime and more to do with efforts at social control (Bachman & Schutt, 2007; Welch,
2005).Who do the penal policy changes of the past thirty years affect most? Acceptance
that incarceration rates reflect crime rates deflects attention from social and demographic
factors germane to the discussion (Selke & Andersson, 1992). Social and geographic
variables have a great influence on incarceration rates (Barker, 2006). Social programs
for the poor and marginalized, intended as anti-crime, have been decreasing over this
same thirty year period; with that comes a removal of poverty as a condition of an
individual and in its place, level of income becomes a matter of free-choice (Chevigny,
2003). A meta-analysis of 116 studies supports the theory that blacks are sentenced more
harshly than whites (Mitchell, 2005). In the Chevigny study the association was positive
for incarceration rate and income inequality – the lower the inequality, the lower the
incarceration rate. Increased imprisonment rates in the U.S. have transformed the welfare
state into the security state. Racial and ethnic disparities are apparent in imprisoned
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populations (Bridges & Crutchfield, 1988). The war on drugs has put more blacks in
prison than all other offenses added together (Yates & Whitford, 2009).
Hogeveen (2005) writes of the ‘valorizing’ of victims in the U.S. and suggests the
belief held by many is anything that harms the offender helps the victim by extension, so
greater punishment of the offender will be associated with greater benefits to the victims.
The public has limited knowledge of the criminal justice system (except of course those
brought in to it, such as Professor Gates); most people overestimate crime rates (Roberts,
1992). Equating tough on crime with mass incarceration, the media has contributed to the
growth of the police state over the past thirty years, (Altheide & Coyle, 2006). Crime is a
staple of the media; they control and develop public response to crime rates (Cavender,
2004). The number of redemption movies such as “The Shawshank Redemption”
(Marvin & Darabont, 1994) and “Law Abiding Citizen” (Foster et al., 2009) may be a
result of the increase in awareness of high incarceration rates and large numbers of exoffenders in the population (Nellis, 2009). The public may be beginning to understand
not all offenders should be locked up (Petersilia, 1997).
In a 1998 article in The Atlantic, Eric Schlosser interviewed Michael Tonry, a
professor of Public Policy and Law at the University of Minnesota and an expert on
sentencing policy, about his opinion of the extraordinarily high U.S. incarceration rates.
Tonry opined that if one were to take the same number of individuals incarcerated today
and randomly selected others from the population to replace those now serving time, you
would also see crime decline (Schlosser, 1998; Tonry & Farrington, 1995). In other
words it is the sheer number of people locked up that is associated with crime reduction,
not who these people are. Above all else, the U.S. system of justice has diminished the
11

commitment to human rights and values (Tonry, 2009). Getting tough has become
synonymous with getting rough (Welch, 2005). One author goes as far as to state that the
American response to crime and criminals is cruel and expensive, and wastes the lives of
disadvantaged black men (Tonry).
Political Reasons for Penal Policy
Fear of crime is defined as an anxious emotional state that reflects the mindset
that one is in danger of criminal victimization (Wakefield & Fleming, 2009). In an
examination of incarceration rates in developed countries from 1975-2000, Tonry (2009)
found an inverse relationship between levels of imprisonment and three important
measures – trust in government, perceived legitimacy of government, and strength of
welfare programs. The appeal to public safety is used as a source of legitimizing
government power to control citizens (Chevigny). Incarceration is one of the most
extreme forms of state power (Mears, 2006).
An immense amount of federal funding was made available for broad-based state
law enforcement efforts in the 1960s and 1970s. The effect of this significant funding
was to impact state enforcement policies. In the 1980s the funding was expanded to
include low-level, routine criminal offenses with the same effect of impacting
enforcement policies. As Yates and Whitford (2009) describe, programs that represented
a joint undertaking of state law enforcement and federal law enforcement officials, such
as multijurisdictional task forces, allowed the President of the United States to garner
influence over state penal policy with little state oversight. Explicitly stated in the U.S.
Constitution, criminal law enforcement has traditionally been a matter of state control
(Mengler, 1995). The federal government encouraged punitive state policies by providing
12

funding incentives to adopt and enforce certain laws (Steen & Bandy, 2007). In 2008,
states spent a total of approximately $52 billion on corrections, approximately 10% of
that came from money the federal government infused in local law enforcement agencies
(Scott-Hayward, 2009).
In 1970 Congress voted to eliminate most federal mandatory minimum sentencing
for drug offenses, calling prisons barbaric and ineffective as a means of control
(Schlosser, 1998). As governor of New York in 1973, with an eye towards the goal of
vice presidency, Nelson Rockefeller decided to try a bold political experiment. He called
for an immediate increase in harsh sentencing which met with great public support with
the new rhetoric the public received about the increasing crime dangers to the average
New York resident. His gamble paid off and he became the Vice President of the United
States in 1974. In other states the politically ambitious followed suit. Ultimately the
repealed federal drug laws were reenacted and the race to toughness had begun
(Schlosser, 1998).
In 1980s and 1990s the U.S. criminal justice system shifted to a more punitive
model. The political system rewarded tough on crime positions from the late 1970s to
today (Beale, 2003). As Mauer (1999) observes:
The primary goal of harsher sentencing policies is to satisfy the needs of the
politician in their seemingly insatiable desire to appear tougher on
crime…Perhaps nowhere in the realm of public policy is there a greater
disjunction between research and policy. (pp.12-13)
Candidates from both major parties compete to be tougher on crime than their
opponents, tougher on crime being a uniting cause (Chevigny, 2003). The right wing of
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the Republican Party was most successful at infusing and legitimizing the pervasive
paranoid mentality (Tonry, 2009). Penal policies are ultimately driven by political
motivations (Smith, 2004). Politicians govern through crime; state power is extended
through tough sanctions (Fleury-Steiner, B. D., Dunn, & Fleury-Steiner, R., 2009).
Although the stated objective of greater punitive policies is crime control, a
competing objective has been political gain (Mauer, 1999). The main character in Franz
Kafka’s 1925 classical literary short novel The Trial recognizes politics are ultimately
behind his arrest and trial (Kafka, 1998). Political context influences sentencing (Weidner
et al., 2005). As a demonstration of state power, imprisonment is extraordinary, and the
exercise of this state power is often motivated by personal political advancement (Smith,
2004, p. 930).
Crime legislation can be viewed as symbolic politics used to deliberately exploit
the public fear of crime (Beale, 2003). Rhetoric and symbols are used to reinforce the
fear factor rather. The current system valorizes expressed crime control policies in
preference to more rational analyses (Newburn & Jones, 2007). No politician wants to
appear soft on crime by questioning the usefulness of the more punitive penal policies
(Rhodes, 1990). An endless inventory of recent penal policies has been designed to inflict
increasing amounts of pain on the offender (Cullen, Fisher, & Applegate, 2000).
Comprehensive studies have raised serious doubts as to the relationship between
the decrease in crime rates and tough on crime policies of the last thirty years (Lawson,
2004). Elected officials’ beliefs about public support for harsher sentencing influences
their criminal justice policies. The lack of public knowledge about trends in crime rates,
criminal laws, and what citizens’ rights are under the Constitution is substantial and
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pervasive. People will report their belief that crime is increasing despite that fact it has
fluctuated over the past fifty years (Roberts, 1992). According to the best research
available, prisons do not deter crime but they do fulfill emotional needs (Maruna, 2007).
A survey of 2,250 Floridians found an association between fear of crime and
punitive inclinations (Costelloe et al., 2009). The strongest relationship was shown
between punitiveness and economic insecurity with white males of low education tending
to be the most punitive. The media feeds on this fear, as crime has become a staple of that
industry; the blurring of news and entertainment are relevant to media depiction of crime
(Cavender, 2004).
The fear of crime makes for illogical policies. For example, neighborhood watch
programs have been found to be ineffective at crime control but that fact has not
diminished the enthusiastic support for them as a crime control technique (Tonry &
Farrington, 1995). With regard to sex offenders, all are required to register with their
state of residence; in most states this period is at least ten years. In Virginia, along with
many other conditions of probation, offenders are required to report to the local police
station every Halloween eve, take a drug test, and remain at the police station during the
time children go trick-or-treating, despite the fact that not one incident has ever occurred
on Halloween anywhere in the United States (Robbers, 2009). Most sex offender
incidents occur with a child known to the offender, not a stranger; only 17% of all
reported sex offender crimes were with strangers and all of those came from internet
contacts (Craun & Theriot, 2009). The public information of sex offenders’ residences
can serve to reduce what should be heightened vigilance when it comes to children’s
vulnerability with those adults known to them. The United States and the United
15

Kingdom have very similar histories with regard to penal policies up to the 1970s, yet the
U.K. does not make sex offender residence location public. The U.S. public registry is
viewed by some as too punitive and ineffective at reducing repeat offending (Jones &
Newburn, 2002).
By maintaining high rates of incarceration, states seek legitimacy at the expense
of the socially and economically marginalized (Barker, 2006). The criminal justice
system is used as a device to maintain socio-economic segregation of those that ‘have’
from those that ‘do not have’ (Arvanites & Asher, 1995). Given the U.S. demographics of
blacks and non-blacks, the fact that the percent of blacks imprisoned is significantly
greater than the percent of non-blacks imprisoned suggests that discriminatory practices
are employed (Selke & Andersson, 2003). The greater the proportion of disenfranchised,
poor, and marginalized, the greater the perceived threat to others (Smith, 2004). The
penal harm movement policies were enacted explicitly to do greater harm to offenders
(Clear, 1994). Criminal punishment schemes are associated with socio-economic
stratification (Bridges & Crutchfield, 1988) and result in differences in enactment and
implementation of penal policies (Barker, 2006). And yet there is a belief that criminal
tendencies emanate from life experiences—remove the negatives and crime goes away
(Gideon, 2009).
Downward Expansion of Crime Definition
Crime is a definition of human conduct created by authorizing agents in a
politically organized society (Quinney, 1970). Reforms in the correctional system
brought with them a new approach to social control (Welch, 2005). Vigorous law
enforcement responses to lesser crimes and disorder are associated with an increase in
16

labeling lower-level incivilities as crimes (Newburn, 2009). The profile of the defendant
as a dangerous offender has been significantly expanded to now include a large number
of non-violent and not so dangerous offenders (Lynch & Sabol, 1997). Welch (2005)
acknowledges the role authorities play in defining crime. Certain behaviors are defined,
labeled, and policed by the state (Coleman et al., 2009).
With the increase in policing and shrewder management of policing have come
increases in the number of individuals charged with crimes (Zimring, 2007). United
States Senator Daniel Moynihan, in a speech in 1992, suggested the need to expand the
definition of unacceptable individual standards and lowering the bar for which
individuals actions are criminalized (Karmen, 1994). Garland (1996) notes that
criminalization is often an evil in itself.
Criminal laws have been, for some time, encroaching on areas previously
considered to be civil in nature. Coffee (1991) asserts that this over-criminalization is
associated with the improper use of criminal sanctions to enforce regulations and that
criminal laws should be focused on the state of mind of the accused (mens rea – guilty
mind), a standard which has no basis in civil laws.
Acts that are criminalized are generally those of the poor (Reiman & Leighton,
2009). Net widening, the practice that ensnares an increasing number of offenders of nonviolent and lower-level crimes has become increasingly inflexible and punishing (Welch,
2005). The decisions prosecutors make about whom to prosecute and what punishment to
exact are virtually unassailable (Higgins, 1999).
The vastly expanding incarceration policies that include minor offenders are not
advisable policy; funds are necessarily diverted from actual needs of societal protection
17

(Levitt, 1996). The less serious offenders that enter prisons under longer sentences
associated with the tough on crime reforms could yield no crime control benefits (Lynch
& Sabol, 1997). The criminal laws are being used as a socializing system of moral
brainwashing (Richards & Ross, 2001). The real problem with these correctional reforms
is finding ways to control the abuses of legal authority (Richards & Avey, 2000). The
over-criminalization represents a “knowing and cynical manipulation of the symbols of
state power and emotions of fear and insecurity which give these symbols their potency”
(Garland, 1996, p. 460).
Capturing the criminal before any real crime occurs as a type of selective law
enforcement is a procedure that ignores empirical validation and theoretical
rationalization. (Miller & Morris, 1986,). Increases in incarceration during the war on
crime have not been the result of increased criminal rates but rather adjustment to the
new criminal justice policies (Hallett, 2002); that is, expansion of the definition of crime.
One of the unintended consequences of the growing use of imprisonment has been
a growing number of criminologists who have experienced incarceration (Austin et al.,
2001). In a prediction made in 2001 that was to come true for Professor Gates in Boston,
Richards and Ross (2001) posited that a dramatic increase in arrests guarantees that the
number of professors with firsthand experience with the criminal justice system will rise.
In fact, the crime for which Professor Gates was arrested (disorderly conduct) represented
the second most frequent non-violent arresting crime in the U.S. The most frequent is
drug abuse, which for the most part means any use of street drugs. In 2006 the total
number of individuals charged with drug abuse was 1,889,810; for disorderly conduct the
total was 703,504 (Hagan, 2011). Out of a total of 14.4 million arrests for crimes in the
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U.S. in 2006, only 4.3% were for violent crimes and 68.2% were for lower-level crimes
such as disorderly conduct, suspicion, curfew violations, and vagrancy (Federal Bureau
of Investigation, 2007).
Plea Bargaining
The majority of all criminal cases, greater than 90%, do not go to trial. Most are
resolved under a plea of guilty, known as taking a plea. The process occurs as follows: a
person is charged with a crime (typically arrested) and before the trial date the prosecutor
will offer some deal to the individual charged if the individual will forgo their right to a
trial. This bargaining typically happens very early on but sometimes a plea is arranged on
the day of the trial (Bergman & Berman, 2008; Chemerinsky & Levenson, 2008; Kadish,
Schulhofer, & Steiker, 2007). The procedure is fairly institutionalized—indeed the courts
across the U.S. would come to a screeching halt if most people accused of crimes
demanded their right to a trial (Bogira, 2005). Plea bargains make the criminal justice
system more efficient by allowing the flow of an ever-growing population of accused to
receive their punishment without using valuable judicial resources (Kadish et al.).
Standard protocol is to inflate the number and gravity of the charges against an
individual in the hope of scaring him or her into accepting a plea. This procedure is
known as puffing or bluffing and is a common tactic (Bibas, 2004). This scheme works
particularly well when used on innocent defendants as such individuals tend to be more
adverse to risk than defendants that are guilty (Bibas, 2004; Bogira, 2005). As Bibas (p.
2495) reports; “The danger that bluffing, fear, or ignorance will skew innocent
defendants’ bargaining is one of the most palpable injustices of plea bargaining.”
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This tendency for the innocent to plead guilty to a charge is precisely why
researchers caution that one should not assume all prisoners are criminals and that
committing a crime has anything to do with going to prison, even for those with multiple
admissions (Richards & Ross, 2001). For those charged with a crime that insist on
exercising their rights to a trial and forgo a plea agreement, studies have shown there is a
differential (harsher) sentencing structure if found guilty (Brereton & Casper, 1981). As
Lynch (2003) notes:
There is no doubt that government officials deliberately use their power to
pressure people who have been accused of a crime, and who are presumed
innocent, to confess their guilt and waive their right to a formal trial. We know
this to be true because prosecutors freely admit that this is what they do. (p. 24)
In fact, prosecutors (and judges) are quite aware that people are admitting to
crimes they did not commit. Taking the charge against the individual at face value, if the
prosecutor offers a different charge (lesser charge) to plead guilty to in order to barter
away the right to a trial, it is almost always the case the individual is admitting guilt to a
crime not committed. This is true whether or not the individual is really guilty of the
originally charged crime; indeed, this practice is institutionalized (Bogira, 2005). There
exists virtually no oversight in the prosecutorial discretion to determine how and when to
load-up charges (Bach, 2009).
When prosecutors can bargain away cases, they are able to hide dubious
confessions and questionable police tactics from public scrutiny. When credible claims of
innocence are bought off with the coercive practice of plea bargaining, there is no
exposure of wrongfulness (Bibas, 2004). To make matters worse, for those individuals
charged with a crime and lacking sufficient funds for an attorney, the court-appointed
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counsel tends to push clients towards taking a plea because the lawyers can generate the
most money by quickly dispensing with a case (Bergman & Berman, 2008; Bibas, 2004;
Bogira, 2005).
Our criminal justice system admits mistakes only when it has to and attempts to
cast doubt on correctness of guilt are set aside unless the defendant can prove innocence
(Baumgartner, De Boef, & Boydstun, 2008). Once a guilty plea is entered there is rarely
any effort at investigating the appropriateness of the finding of guilt. Indeed, the best
evidence available to consider the fallibility of the judicial system comes mostly from
those pleading guilty to murder and/or rape for which DNA testing evidence was not
available at the time of the entered plea and now serves to exonerate. These data reveal a
greater than 2.3% chance of a wrongful death sentence and up to 10% chance of an
erroneous criminal conviction by a jury (Gross & O’Brien, 2008). As Gross and O’Brien
(2008) point out, most false confessions (revealed through post trial investigation and
evidence) lead to false convictions; unfortunately there is virtually no data for erroneous
findings of guilt for misdemeanors and non-violent felonies. Consider the plight of
Professor Gates. Had the charge against him not been dropped the most likely outcome
would have been a plea agreement whereby he would have pled guilty to a lesser charge
(Bogira, 2005). Where would be the evidence to prove he did not commit the crime? As
Gross and O’Brien (2008) further note, the vast majority of all criminal convictions are
for misdemeanors and non-violent crimes and this group probably includes the majority
of all false criminal convictions.
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Increase in Probation
Probation is defined as the procedure by which a defendant found guilty of a
crime is released by the court without imprisonment, subject to conditions imposed by the
court and under the supervision of a probation officer (Gifis, 2003). The status of a
probationer lies somewhere between a prisoner and a free citizen (Filcik, 1990). In 1878 a
Boston cobbler by the name of Augustus began to assist certain individuals charged with
crimes, saving them from incarceration by agreeing to the court to take responsibility for
their non-reoffending. This was the first unofficial recorded probation act (Greenberg,
1981). All states have probation statutes (laws) but few give a definition for it (Horwitz,
2000; Mackenzie & Li, 2002).
From 1980 to 2004 the U.S. experienced a 270% increase in the number of
individuals sentenced to probation; during that same period of time the U.S. population
grew by approximately 24% (Altheide & Coyle, 2006; Kadish et al., 2007). The new
criminal justice approach is to expand the use of probation as an affirmative correctional
device and sentence (Filcik, 1990). As of 1997, 80% of all those convicted of a
misdemeanor were sentenced to probation (Petersilia, 1997). Probation, then, would be
the likely sentence for the misdemeanor for Professor Gates had the authorities not
decided to drop the charge; the probable length of the sentence may be a year or more.
Typically when an individual takes a plea and agrees to probation, the terms are
loosely unspecified. Certainly without the assistance of counsel (and often even with such
assistance) the defendant won’t understand that they have given away all rights to the
presumption of innocence and a violation of any of the numerous conditions imposed on
them could result in a quick trip to prison (as the court now has an admission of guilt of a
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crime) (Bogira, 2005; Hanser, 2010). This process is euphemistically called the delayed
entry program. While some prosecutors still cling to the notion that the probation
agreement is essentially a contract which the courts are required to enforce, the U.S.
Supreme Court has consistently dismissed that argument, citing in particular the unequal
bargaining positions of the parties (Horwitz, 2000).
The U.S. has been experiencing growth of the probation population and a
modification of the probation function (Weissman, 1982). State budgetary pressures are
causing a reconsideration of the punitive model with regard to incarceration (Beale,
2003). Probation, on the other hand, is being treated as a sentence with all the associated
focus on punishment by an increasing number of states. Rehabilitation is being discarded
in favor of retribution and such punishment is enhanced if it inflicts disgrace (Filcik,
1990; Weissman, 1982).
Probation conditions typically fall under two broad categories, standard
conditions and special conditions. The number and degree of punitiveness of these
special conditions of probation have been growing steadily to reflect the perceived
punitive mood of the public (Hanser, 2010; Petersilia, 1997). One third of all offenders in
the federal courts inform the judge they would prefer prison to probation due to the
extreme conditions imposed on them for probation (Petersilia, 1990). Standard conditions
typically include staying crime free (this includes some acts not typically considered
crimes, such as minor traffic violations), regularly reporting to a probation officer, being
gainfully employed, paying all court-imposed fees (including cost of probation), not
having access to any firearms, obtaining and paying for treatment if ordered by the court,
and in many states not consuming or possessing alcohol as well as possibly submitting to
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random urine tests to check for the presence of alcohol or drugs (Bergman & Berman,
2008; Hanser, 2010).
In the case of Professor Gates, Massachusetts does typically include an alcohol
clause, and given the charge he would most likely have been required to attend (and pay
for) anger management treatment. Horwitz (2000) noted special conditions run the gamut
from community service to the wearing of a sign to declare one’s guilt and described the
scope of the sentencing court’s discretion as breathtaking. Probation terms abrogate
constitutional liberties such as freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and freedom from
unreasonable search and seizure (Weissman, 1982). As Horwitz (2000) observed, while
state judges have seen greater restrictions placed on them with regard to incarceration
decisions, they exercise increasing discretion in setting conditions of probation.
The greatest impact on probation terms tends to be financial and costs can run into
the tens of thousands depending on the number and type of conditions imposed and the
length of the sentence (Bergman & Berman, 2008). If a probationer fails to meet all court
imposed financial obligations, revocation of probation and sentencing to incarceration is
possible. The issue of whether or not a court can revoke probation for an individual
lacking means to satisfy court imposed required costs is an unresolved issue; some state
courts agree this can be done (Clarke, 1979). The rate of successful completion of
probation (completion of all required terms) is falling, not surprisingly, as the number
and punitive nature of the conditions are rising. In 1986, 74% of probationers were
successful, in 1992 67%, and by 2004, it fell to 60% (Glaze & Palla, 2005; Petersilia,
1997); more than one in three probationers will be on the delayed entry program.
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Probation services need to monitor a range of factors to determine what is
effective and what is necessary (Nash, 1996). Studies have shown that if after one year on
probation there has been no additional offense, then in nine out of ten cases there will not
be any further offenses (Neithercutt, 1987). Citing a 1980 study of probation data from
northern California, Nethercutt notes that most violations occur within the first six
months. One study showed the social controls of probation to have no effect at all on
criminal behavior (Horney, Osgood, & Marshall, 1995) while another suggested a
decrease in criminal activity associated with probation (Mackenzie & Li, 2002). The
latter study, however, used questionable criminal behavior variables such as lack of gun
ownership as one of the standard probation conditions (and possibly one not relevant to
most individuals). Some researchers in this field believe if there is no need to restrain
individuals, probation is not appropriate (Clarke, 1979). One might question the wisdom
of putting low risk people on probation given the tight budgets of state probation systems
(Petersilia, 1997). Despite these studies, the use of and time on probation sentences
continue to rise (Altheide & Coyle, 2006).
If probation was used mostly as an alternative to incarceration, states that imposed
greater probation sentences should have lower incarceration rates. There is in fact a
positive correlation between probation lengths and incarceration rates, the opposite of
what would be expected (Petersilia, 1997). An inference can be made that the probation
system is used as a method to incarcerate offenders by having them plead guilty with a
probation sentence, and then revoke the probation for any reason and sentence to
incarceration (Stickels, 2007). Probation officers’ discretionary decisions with regard to
revocation are partly responsible for rising prison admissions in many states (Reaves,
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2005). Probation may be a strategy for disposing of difficult cases with recognition that
probation can be revoked on any violation of conditions (Stickels, 2007).
Probation Revocation
Revocation of probation means simply that probation was taken away from an
individual before the term of the probation sentence ended (Gifis, 2003). Typically the
result of this is some type of incarceration. Recidivism is defined as reoffending. The
interpretation of reoffending is fluid and changes based on both the context and purpose
of usage (Hanser, 2010). It is common for people to refer to revocation rates of
probationers as recidivism rates but that use distorts the true nature of most reasons for
probation revocation (Petersilia, 1992).
Within the context of conditions of probation there are two potential types of
violation; reoffending and technical. A reoffending violation means the individual
committed a criminal act (any violation of a state or federal law) while on probation.
Such criminal acts can range from jaywalking to murder. A technical violation would be
a non-compliance with any of the other conditions of probation that do not refer to state
or federal laws (Morgan, 1993). Technical violations can range from non-payment of
probation fees to unsuccessful court ordered ‘treatment’ outcome and everything in
between. Put succinctly, probation widens the net of social control (Morgan, 1993).
With courts and prosecutors moving towards longer probation with greater
numbers of conditions, the potential for revocation has increased for the individual
probationer (Clarke, 1979), this despite studies showing strictness of supervision has little
impact on reoffending rates (Hearnden & Millie, 2003) and the fact that length of
probation sentence is inversely related to failures—the longer the sentence the more
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likely the failure (Gray, Fields, & Maxwell, 2001). The growth in prisons in recent years
comes from supervision violations (Mauer, 2002). Rates of probation could be predicted
to increase incarceration rates by providing further opportunities for imprisonment
through revocation (Sorensen & Stemen, 2002, p. 461). There are too few procedural
safeguards in place for probationers charged with violating conditions of probation (Best
& Birzon, 1963).
Technical violations constitute the most common type of probation violation
(Gray et al., 2001) and the easiest to prove at revocation hearings (Stickels, 2007). While
criminal acts require an intention to commit a crime (a guilty mind), courts consistently
find probationers’ willful or intentional violation of conditions unnecessary; the mere fact
that a condition has not been met is sufficient (Miller, Sluder, & Laster, 1999). Consider
that one study found 2/3 of employers were unwilling to hire someone with a criminal
record (Graffam, Shinkfield, & Hardcastle, 2008) and imagine the difficulty a probationer
might have securing employment (as a condition of probation) and paying fees (as an
additional condition). Another study found the false positive rate for urinalysis testing
ranging between 0.8% and 4.1% (Visher, 1991). This means with 100 tests there may be
as many as four mistakes (false positives) that will put the probationer in violation and
send them to prison.
In a study of Michigan probationers, only 4.4% of revocations were associated
with reoffending while 11.4% were for failure to pay (Gray et al., 2001). A study of
probationers in Texas from 1993-2000 revealed the percent of technical violations had
increased during this time period from 42% to 55% (Stickels, 2007). Researchers have
consistently found influential factors for revocation are not grounded in past, present, or
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future criminal behavior (Kerbs, Jones, & Jolley, 2009), and no evidence suggests noncompliance with conditions increase likelihood of criminal activity (Padfield, 2006). A
1987 study identified prior convictions, income at arrest, and living arrangements as the
important variables for predicting probation failures (Morgan, 1999). Failure to
reintegrate is due to employment and financial difficulties (Polerino, 2009); once placed
under probation, none of these variables are within the control of the probationer.
Revocation is, by and large, an administrative decision rather than a legal one
(Steen, 2007)—if court involvement is required, the decisions of the probation officers
are almost always followed (Bogira, 2008). In Oregon, probation officers have the
authority to jail offenders for a positive drug test without a hearing; there is no oversight
and no pretense of judicial review (Taxman, 1995). Revocations involving technical
violations are more ambiguous than that of reoffending, thus giving the probation officer
more discretion (Steen, 2007). In one study of 1,050 probation office practices, 62.5%
reported polices requiring formal action for certain violations while only 10.8% had
policies to inhibit formal action for certain violations (Kerbs et al., 2009). When
probation officers ranked technical violations from the most serious to the least serious,
they listed failure to report as the first and failure to pay financial penalties as the second
most serious infraction (Taxman, 1995). Money is clearly on the mind of the probation
officers and probationers must feel the pressure to find a way to come up with the
funds—perhaps any way to get the money to avoid incarceration.
Regarding these revocations for technical violations, while race did not predict
new crime (reoffending) it did predict who would have probation revoked (Padfield &
Maruna, 2006). Many states show a significant relationship between race and revocation
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for technical violations; blacks have a disproportionate share of such revocations (Gray et
al., 2001). Higher levels of education are associated with a decrease in likelihood of
revocation for a technical violation (Gray et al.), perhaps due in part to the fact that the
technical violation is less likely to be of a financial nature. Minority status was associated
with revocation more often when the original offense was less serious and the offender
had no prior criminal history (Steen & Bandy, 2007). This would have been exactly the
profile for Professor Gates had he been placed on probation. There is a certain degree of
justice by geography in that southern states are more punitive than non-southern states,
and smaller courts more punitive than larger courts (Kerbs et al., 2009).
Most violations are only irresponsible, not criminal; the need to deter crime is not
served by revocation for such violations (Clarke, 1979). No significant relationship has
been found between re-arrest and technical violations for probationers (Piquero, 2003)
and yet one study found 95% of all revocation motions were for technical violations
(Stickels, 2007). As Clarke (1979) asserts, the lack of success with a court ordered
treatment program, a coerced cure, should not even be considered a violation. With
deferred adjudication, a technical violation allows the court to easily convict a defendant
of a serious offense and sentence the individual to substantial prison time (Stickels,
2007). As Clarke (1979) argues, revocation should not occur unless restraint is necessary.
Criminal Justice Industrial Complex
The phrase prison industrial complex has been in circulation for a while and is
used in a manner similar to that of the expression military industrial complex, which
refers to the policy relationship between the military and the industrial (private) sector
developed during WWII. Use of the phrase military industrial complex is intended to
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reflect a critical comment on the too cozy relationship between public services and
private enterprise, a relationship fraught with political corruption and moral hazard
(Kennedy, 2001). U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, in 1961, warned of the dangers
to the American people if this relationship were allowed to dictate policies in the United
States (Medhurst, 1994).
Use of the phrase prison industrial complex is meant to imply the same type of
dangerous and inappropriate relationship between the public and private sectors, in this
case with regard to imprisonment (Altheide & Coyle, 2006; Lapido, 2001; Schlosser,
1998). Recently, a more inclusive term has surfaced to refer to the entire correctional
system—probation, parole, jails, and prisons—in recognition of the expanded list of those
in the private sector with financial incentives to keep the system humming along: the
criminal justice industrial complex (McLennan, 2008; Welch, 2005).
Private sector development promotes and assists the expansion of imprisonment
(Garland, 1996). As Newburn (2002, p.178) states, the number of private individuals and
corporations with an interest in the growth and profitability of the corrections system is
large and expanding. The dependence on correctional policies to exact criminal fines on
those of lesser means has been a fundamental part of the U.S. criminal justice system for
some time; unemployment will undermine just such a system that relies so heavily on
financial penalties (Garland, 1991). “When free market enterprises intersect with a
captive market, abuses are bound to occur” (Schlosser, 1998). Many employees and
communities rely on the income the correctional system generates and efforts to reduce
states’ punitive response to crime will be seen as a threat to their livelihood (Mauer,
2002). As an example, consider the state of New York, in which from 1988 to 2000 the
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spending on public universities decreased 29% while funding for prisons increased 79%,
this despite a decrease in crime during the same time period (Austin et al., 2001). The
restructuring of the public sector has created the new authoritarian state, with traditional
notions of public and private sectors becoming unclear (Coleman, et al., 2009).
The criminal justice system seems amazingly unmoved by the treatment of
relatively harmless lawbreakers as threatening and dangerous offender (Kraska &
Neuman, 2008; Welch, 2005). The economic needs of the corrections industry, writes
Welch (2005), demands an ever-increasing supply of offender bodies to remain profitable
and the true culpability of those caught up in the net is irrelevant as profits are made
regardless of whether an individual is a real threat to the community or not.
With the proliferation of private interests in the corrections industry, humans have
become a commodity. The offenders are products; their incarcerated bodies valued for
their per diem payments (Donohue & Moore, 2009; Hallett, 2002). McLennan (2008)
writes about the U.S. history of imprisonment and the earlier use of prison labor as a state
sanctioned form of slavery. Interestingly, the reason this practice was halted had nothing
to do with the cruel and sub-human conditions these individuals were exposed to but
rather the conflict that free labor (and the training required to exact it) was to the
tradesmen competing for jobs (McLennan, 2008).
There has been a long standing tradition in the U.S. of criminal punishment
policies being a product of an agenda other than crime control (Hallett, 2002). Prisoners
in private prisons come from many states. In a rent-a-cell business model, a broker is
contacted by a state corrections official to locate a prison with ‘space’ and arranges the
transport of the commodity; there is greater regulation of interstate transport of cattle than
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these humans (Schlosser, 1998). The increased investment in the corrections system is
consistent with a capitalist approach to acquisition of wealth for the affluent through
oppressive measures of control upon the poor and marginalized (Blomberg & Cohen,
2003).
Hallett (2002, p. 372) found in a 1997 analysis of the private (non-governmental)
prison industry, four threats to profitability were identified: (1) falling crime; (2) shorter
prison terms; (3) alternatives to incarceration; and (4) reduction in the use of mandatory
prison sentence for non-violent crimes. With staffing accounting for 75-80% of
correctional budgets (Scott-Hayward, 2009), the focus of many employed in the industry
on profitability is predictable.
Current punitive policies have significant support from those with a financial
stake in the criminal justice system: state, federal and privately run prisons, probation
systems, court-ordered treatment program providers, drug testing centers, and the like
(Beale, 2003). Sources of funding for tough on crime initiatives can be found among
those groups with a substantial vested interest in maintaining or increasing the flow of
human bodies through criminal justice system. For example, the driving force behind
California’s three strikes legislation received 78% of initiative total funding from the
state prison guard union (Beale, 2003).
The increase in imprisonment is associated with the increase in the role of
capitalism in the corrections system (Welch, 2005). Growth in the prison population in
recent years comes from the supervision violation (Mauer, 2002). The tough on crime
legislation that has been the driving force behind the new punitive system took away
much of the discretion regarding those charged with crimes from judges and gave it to
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community corrections supervisors (Welch, 2009). These new brands of adjudicators
have neither the legal background nor the professional experience of appointed judges.
As Garland (1991, p. 149) describes, incarceration is legally disguised as a simple
loss of liberty, the true toll it takes on both the incarcerated individual and their family is
concealed from the public. The government has the power to suffocate people and causes
(Ivins & Dubose, 2007). As Welch (2005, p. 149) aptly noted, “Profiting from corrections
is different from other forms of privatization because it reduces the administration of
justice to the accumulation of capital at the expense of programmatic and humanitarian
ideals.”
Statistical Methods in Criminal Justice Research
Researchers in the field of criminal justice have been utilizing increasingly
sophisticated statistical techniques to address hypotheses. The ordinary least squares
method has been fairly commonly used in research on crime data. In 1985, a study was
conducted to determine which explanatory variables (racial composition, welfare rates,
economic inequality) were significant in a model to predict incarceration rates per state
(Carroll & Cornell, 1985). Modeling parole violations by state, Rhodes (1990) considered
the political composition of the state and percent of state residents in favor of the death
penalty. Looking at state level data, Patterson (1991) predicted criminal activity with
various state economic variables. State incarceration rate was used as the dependent
variable by Selke and Andersson (1992).
In a 1995 study predicting state level incarceration rates, the researchers
considered geographic location, percent blacks in the state and income inequality for
inclusion in the model (Arvanites & Asher, 1995). A generalized least squares method
33

was employed to predict state incarceration rates based on state level racial composition,
income inequality, and welfare rates (Greenberg & West, 2001). Using state level data on
the number of prisoners serving at least a year in prison per 100,000 state residents, a
researcher tested for inclusion in the linear regression model, race, poverty,
unemployment, and unequal income distribution in each state (Smith, 2004). In all of
these studies that predicted some variation on incarceration (at least one year, overall
rates, and criminal activity) only race was consistently found to be a significant predictor.
A time series analysis was utilized to predict state level incarceration rates from
1950 -1990 (Jacobs & Helms, 1996). Logistic regression was used in one study to predict
the odds of probation revocation in a study of North Carolina cases (Sims & Jones, 1997)
and in another to predict the odds of recidivism (Hancock & Raeside, 2009). Path
analysis was employed in a study of factors related to crime rate reduction (Logan, 1993)
and in an examination of factors related to prison crowding (Steiner & Wooldredge,
2008; Wooldredge, 1996). In 2002, using exploratory factor analysis, researchers
examined the dimensions of criminal attitude and criminal conduct (Simourd, & Olver,
2002). Self control theory associated with crime was analyzed using a Rasch Model
(Higgins, 2007).
Multilevel modeling, or hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), has recently
surfaced in criminal justice research, with HLM applications in this field steadily
increasing since 2005. A multilevel model was employed to predict the odds of
committing a violent offense, with survey item responses within each respondent as level
one variables and the attributes of the neighborhoods these respondents resided in as level
two variables (Sampson, Morenoff, & Raudenbush, 2005). Analyzing homicide trends in
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44 countries, HLM was used to determine the impact of democratization of a country
(level two) on the homicide rates across regions of each country (level one) (Lafree &
Tseloni, 2006). In a 2008 study predicting crowding in prisons, inmate attributes were
used as level one variables and characteristics associated with the various prisons as level
two variables (Steiner & Wooldredge, 2008). Also in 2008, a multilevel study was
conducted predicting the probability of sentencing as a habitual offender, with individual
characteristics as the level one variables and county attributes as the level two variables
(Crow & Johnson, 2008).
Most recently, two studies from 2009 report HLM results. In one, odds of
completion of day reporting programs for non-incarcerated offenders were analyzed
using the individual attributes as level one variables and the program characteristics as
level two variables (Craddock, 2009). In another, an offense seriousness score was
predicted using multilevel modeling with the offender attributes as level one variables
and the probation office policies as level two variables (Kautt, 2009).
This present research study will rely on a large inmate survey that has been
conducted at time intervals beginning in 1974. Some work has been done to analyze the
reliability and validity of this data source. In 1999, the responses to this survey were
found to vary in a systematic fashion, lending support to validity of the data (Camp,
1999). In 2002, with an eye towards the possibility respondents may exaggerate,
researchers suggested this was not likely (Camp, Gaes, Klein-Saffran, Daggett, & Saylor,
2002). In addition, these researchers found no systematic bias in type of respondent
completing the survey (Camp et al.). Using a correlation analysis to validate inmate
survey responses, measures of perceived safety on the part of the inmates were found to
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be strongly associated with official misconduct reported (Daggett & Camp, 2009). These
authors write that such surveys are an alternative data source providing accurate and
important information. Finally, using HLM analysis on the inmate survey data, a study
was conducted to determine which level one variables (inmates) and level two variables
(prison) were useful in predicting inmate violence (Huebner, 2003).
Importance of State Level Data
“States exercise extraordinary discretion in the substance and implementation of
their criminal laws” (Yates & Whitford, 2009, p. 877). Yet differences among states’
corrections policies have been largely ignored (Greenberg & West, 2001). There is
greater variation in incarceration rates across U.S. states than across all nations of
Western Europe, despite the diversity among these European nations (Zimring &
Hawkins, 1991). The U.S. is not a coherent or singular state but is instead a mixture of
democratic practices, creating and resulting in differences in enactment and
implementation of correctional policies (Barker, 2006). Criminal justice and state
activities are inextricably linked (Coleman et al., 2009) but there is a dearth of
sophisticated studies of correctional policies using national samples; such studies are
desperately needed (Cullen et al., 2000).
States vary greatly on important correctional relevant variables. For example,
differences in the way states exercise their power (in an effort to maintain legitimacy)
will produce varying degrees of reliance on incarceration (Barker, 2006). A substantial
variation in racial disparities in imprisonment exists across states (Bridges & Crutchfield,
1988). Variation in state probation rates have been used to rank states (Hanser, 2010).
While incarceration has generally been increasing, some states have diverged from the
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national trend (Barker, 2006); scant attention has been given to explaining why some
states ‘aggressively’ incarcerate their residents while others do not (Mears, 2006). One
study found increases in murder rates in only those states that had enacted three strikes
policies; the hypothesis was that fear of super incarceration provoked offenders to kill
potential witnesses (Chen, 2008). Even such unrelated indices as perceived health were a
source of variation across states (Subramanian, Kawachi, & Kennedy, 2001).
At the state level, corrections constitute a substantial percent of all state
expenditures and this percent varies by state (Mauer, 2002). Researchers have recognized
keeping crime in abeyance involves the willingness of correctional agencies to confront
social structures that represent obstacles to crime reduction; this willingness on the part
of political and correctional individuals varies by state (Bracken, Deane, & Morrissette,
2009). On the other hand, there are some drawbacks to using state level data. You lose, as
one author put it, the charming regional differences (Sedaris, 2004, p. 183). Aggregation
at the state level misses such things as relative and absolute poverty indices (Patterson,
1991). While the states write and pass laws, counties interpret them, which leads to
variations within states (Baumgartner et al., 2008).
A measure of the state’s punitiveness—how punishing the response is to lowlevel crime, for example—is useful and important as an index of state level corrections
activity. Several studies have attempted to capture this measure. Greenberg and West
(2001) used the incarceration rate per 100,000 as an index to rank state punitiveness. This
measure, however, does not include variables that should be factored in. For example, if a
state has built many prisons they may have ‘borrowed’ inmates from other states. Austin
and Tillman (1988) proposed a punitiveness ranking of states based on the number of
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inmates per 100,000 and total control rates (to include, in addition to those incarcerated,
those on community supervision) per 100,000. This additive measure does little to
account for the size of the differences in incarceration and probation rates among states—
some states have correction rates substantially larger than others (Cullen et al., 2000). A
more sophisticated (and complex) index of state punitiveness that takes into account
crime rates, arrest rates and imprisonment rates was proposed by Selke and Andersson
(1992). This last metric represents a movement in the right direction by recognizing the
interaction of these other variables on states’ punitiveness but it does not factor in the
change over time with this snapshot approach.
None of the existing measures consider the change of the state’s correctional
policies over time. Additionally, in support of theories that suggest some states have been
actively defining crime down (expanding the definition of crime to ensnare more and
more residents), none of the indices have accounted for the ratio of serious crime to
lower-level ‘crime’ such as that with which Professor Gates was charged.
Importance of this Research Study
Several studies have examined the association between crime rates and
incarceration levels but none have found any significant relationship (Chamlin & Myer,
2009; Greenberg, Kessler, & Logan, 1979; Logan, 1975). States are unable to support
policies for locking up their citizens as needed for safety. Although a study looking at
policies targeting minor offenses found an association with some reduction in certain
types of crimes, the author admits that using the number of misdemeanors per state was a
crude measure (Worrall, 2006). The states’ use of symbolic (compared to real) threats to
safety (e.g., airports’ public announcements of the current terrorist threat level/color;
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racial profiling stops and searches) has been found to be a significant predictor of
incarceration rates (Mears, 2006).
The total cost of punitive strategies is tremendous. States’ tough on crime policies
are associated with massive budgetary costs and societal damage (Chen, 2008).
Correctional spending has been the fastest growing component of state general fund
budgets beginning in the 1980s (Rubin & Wood, 1990). Compelling evidence suggests
imprisonment has a brutalizing effect on prisoners (Hallett, 2002). The collateral damage
done to communities, children, health and families is enormous (Hagan & Dinovitzer,
1999; Shinkfield & Graffam, 2009).
If all the above isn’t sufficient to cause states to reconsider their punitive polices,
consider the racial component of these correctional practices. Racism is apparent in
education, politics, and economic structures so it is not completely surprising it is found
in the criminal justice system—it is hard to get ahead behind bars (Hagan, 2011; Pager,
2007). Georges-Abeyie (1989) writes of the experiences of young black men with police
practices of stop-and-question, stop-and-frisk imposed on such a greater percent of the
poor as a form on government sanctioned non-white segregation. The current correctional
policies have a profound effect on young black men, producing an enduring low social
stratum (Thompson, 2008).
The principle of proportionality requires a government take no action that exceeds
that which is necessary; this has consistently been violated within the states’ criminal
justice system (Reiman & Leighton, 2009). Revocation is punishment on the installment
plan (Steen & Bandy, 2007). States need to remove individuals from supervision or never
put them there in the first place (Scott-Hayward, 2009). Often, corrections policies are
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vague and confusing, ensnaring the unsuspecting offender (Ruback, Ruth, & Shaffer,
2005).
There is a need to improve the public understanding of the criminal justice system
and political decisions made concerning this system (Newburn, 2009). The existing body
of knowledge on incarceration has a nearly exclusive focus on large prisons in urban
areas (Applegate & Sitren, 2008). States should be exploring (and the federal government
should be encouraging) methods to decrease rates of incarceration, probation, and parole
(Austin et al., 2001). Additional research on imprisonment rates of the states can only
improve our understanding of the processes that compel states to solve social disorder
problems by locking up citizens (Barker, 2006). With a great understanding of the
challenges facing those pushing back against the punitive state policies, Coleman et al.
(2009) write:
Social scientists would do well to maintain vigilance on and over the enemy of
social justice, social equity and democratic accountability. These enemies are far
more likely to emerge within, and out of, the moving target that is state power…to
challenge state power is to enter the eye of the storm. (p. 212)
Criminal sentencing is specific to an individual but the sentencing schemes are
unique to each state. Several studies have sought to examine the effects of both legal
(e.g., prior criminal record, current offense) and extra legal (not governed by law such as
race, income, education level) on sentencing decisions. A thorough review of literature
reveals nine research studies to date relating to the present study and utilizing multilevel
modeling analyses. Three studies (Kautt, 2009; Kautt, 2002; Spohn, 2000) examined
influences, both legal and extra-legal, on federal sentencing practices. Focusing on one
state in a multilevel analysis, Crow and Johnson (2008) evaluated the effect of both legal
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and extra-legal variables on the designation of habitual offender status in Florida. Two
studies used sentencing data from Pennsylvania for multilevel modeling—Britt (2000)
examined the impact of social context and race on punishment decisions, and Ulmer and
Johnson (2004) studied the effect of contextual variables and the interaction effect on
regional court decisions.
The first to consider multi-state data, Gillespie (2005) examined the impact of
correctional practices on drug abuse using data from Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio in a
multilevel analysis. Another multi-state, multilevel study considered imprisonment
decisions on felony cases in 39 of the 75 most populous counties in the U.S. (Weidner et
al., 2005). Finally, Huebner (2003), using the same inmate survey (but a different year) as
the present research study employs, analyzed through multilevel modeling the effect of
various prison practices on inmate violence. None of the multilevel studies to date have
considered the impact state level (all states) contextual variables have on sentencing
practices—that is the purpose of the present research study. These past studies have
demonstrated the utility of multilevel modeling in this research area.
Summary
Incarceration rates have been rising across the U.S. while crime rates have been
dropping. The U.S. national rate of corrections involvement of 1 in 31 means in a room
of 31 randomly selected U.S. residents, one will be ‘involved’ with the criminal justice
system under either imprisonment or probation (or both). This rate varies by state. Many
researchers believe the current penal policies (especially the ever expanding definition of
crime) are at their heart about political grandstanding and not associated with crime
concerns.
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Because crime has been defined downward, what were once thought of as
incivilities are now criminal acts. The assertion by Professor Gates which he shared with
the police officer, that he (the officer) was a racist, is an excellent example of an incivility
that is defined as a crime. Once arrested, most folks (greater than 90%) will never
exercise their right to a trial and will instead take a plea in which they admit guilt to
something. This admission is most likely to occur on the part of innocent people as they
are the most risk averse. The prosecutor’s office will use all tools available (puffing,
padding charges, etc.) to compel the taking of a plea. Since the majority of crimes
charged come from these acts formally known as uncivil and now known as criminal,
probation is a likely outcome for many that take a plea. Probation levels have been rising
dramatically in the past 30 years to reflect this.
With little understanding of the terms and conditions of probation until after
accepting pleas, an ‘offender’ will be required to meet more and more punitive and
needlessly humiliating requirements for a longer and longer period of time. Those in the
corrections industry know one in three probationers will be unable to fulfill the
conditions imposed, and for these unfortunate individuals the move to imprisonment is
swift. Professor Gates would likely have received probation and he would likely have
successfully completed the term of his sentence as socio-economic status is the single
best predictor of completion. The wedding of private financial interests to state criminal
justice systems has helped keep pressure on politicians to continue the tough on crime
polices known to be harmful to the disadvantaged and socially marginalized, and
extremely costly to the states.
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Chapter Three: Method
Overview
This research study addressed several theoretical hypotheses using individual
level inmate data and state level variables. Inmate level data were obtained from the 2004
Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional Facilities (U.S. Department of
Justice, 2007). State level data are derived from U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, and the U.S. Census Bureau. The inmate survey data contain detailed
information on over 3,000 variables. Of particular interest was length of sentence,
whether or not the sentence is associated with a probation violation and if so for what
probation condition, race of the individual, and education level of the individual. The
inmate survey responses provide a rich source of data that have been validated for use by
multiple researchers (Camp et al., 2002; Daggett & Camp, 2009).
The present study had two sequential foci: (1) to develop meaningful
measures/indices of a state’s level of punitiveness and movement towards or away from a
more punitive, increasingly broader definition/approach to crime control, and (2) to use
these newly developed indices, along with other state level variables and inmate level
variables, in a multilevel modeling analysis to determine the influence of state contextual
factors and individual extra legal factors on sentence length imposed.
To develop new, more useful indices of level of punitiveness for the present
research study, multiple rates from states were considered. With data obtained from the
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Bureau of Justice Statistics, each state’s lower-level crime count (crime other than
violent, property, drug-related, or traffic tickets) is compared to the violent crime count
(murder, attempted murder, rape, and assault) using the punitive severity index (PSI),
defined as the ratio of lower-level crime count to violent crime count. In the multilevel
model to follow, for each state the average PSI over the ten year period 1995–2004 is
used as a measure reflecting the overall scope and scale of a state’s interest in lower-level
crime. The average yearly percent change in this ratio (i.e., the average of all percentage
differences between adjacent years)—the punitive progression index (PPI)—is used as a
measure of the change in a state’s handling of not-so-criminal acts versus serious
criminal acts. A negative value of the PPI implies a decrease in the ratio of lower-level
crime to violent crime over time and a positive value implies an increase in this ratio over
the ten year period. Values close to zero reflect little change in this ratio.
Sampling
This research study uses data from the 2004 Survey of Inmates in State and
Federal Correctional Facilities (U.S. Department of Justice, 2007). The sample data were
derived from surveys and personal interviews of inmates from 287 correctional facilities
during mid-2004. Using a two stage sampling design, the sample was selected from 1,801
institutions with 1,115,853 male and 77,404 female individuals incarcerated. At stage one
of the sampling design, selection was based on population, region, and security level of
institutions from the 2000 Census of State and Federal Correctional Facilities (Karberg &
Stephan, 2003). Stage two involved systematic sampling of inmates from the prisons
selected in stage one, based on probabilities proportional to the size of the prisons using
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the list of all individuals that occupied a bed the previous night. The non-response rate at
stage two was 10.23%.
The database consists of 6,034 observations (respondents) for which length of
sentence expressed in years was recorded. These 6,034 observations consisted of 4,798
males and 1,236 females, nested within all fifty states. Since female respondents were
eliminated due to their small representation in overall percent of inmates (less than 10%)
and the significant differences (p = .0109) in average length of sentences between males
(15.89 years) and females (12.74 years), the sample size for this study is 4,798. State
level data were constructed by aggregating individual respondent surveys by state. Table
1 provides a summary of the variables from the sample data used in this study.
Table 1: Sample Data
Variable

Description

Black

Offender race: Black = 1, Non-Black = 0

Black Percent

Percent of Blacks living in U.S. states in 2004

Education

0 = never attended school, 1 = 1st grade, 2 = 2nd grade,
…, 12 = high school graduate, 13 = freshman in college,
…, 16 = undergraduate degree

Average Punitive Severity Index
(Average PSI)

Average of {(Lower-Level Crime)/(Violent Crime)} over
10 year period

Punitive Progression Index (PPI)

Average rate of growth of {(Lower-Level Crime)/(Violent
Crime)} over 10 year period

Probation Rate

2004 probation per 100,000 state residents

Sentence Length

Length of sentence in years

Type of Probation

Type of probation oversight: Executive = 1, Judicial = 0
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Instrument
Survey
The Survey of Inmates in State Correctional Facilities is conducted periodically
on behalf of the United States Department of Justice to provide national information
about characteristic of inmates held in states prisons. The Department of Justice solicits
bids for collections agents that develop and administer the surveys. The surveys are
intended to be nationally representative and are collected through face-to-face personal
interviews. Designed to be broad in scope, the survey addresses current and past issues of
the inmates.
The Survey of Inmates was collected in 1974, 1979, 1986, 1991, 1997 and 2004.
This periodic survey provides information on individual characteristics of inmates;
criminal histories, health, family background, education, income, current offense and
sentences, parole and probation. An extensive set of items on the survey targets use of
drugs and alcohol. For the 2004 survey there were 2,984 variables. Approximately 350 of
these variables are for sampling weights, 300 for drug and alcohol use history, 650 for
prior criminal record and another 150 for drug and alcohol use during the commission of
the crime. There are no places to fill in a response so an extensive list of possible
responses are included as items. For example, with regard to alcohol use, the questions
address the use of a particular type (most standard types are listed, e.g. wine, beer, hard
liquor) and then a large series of questions follows dealing with amount of use and
frequency. Again many possible responses are included as questions: e.g., Did you drink
beer every day? Did you drink beer every other day? Did you drink beer three times a
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week? Did you drink beer multiple times a day? And so on. Ultimately there are
surprisingly few variables available for inclusion in this study due to low responses rates.
Whether from the numbing effect of being asked to answer so many survey questions, a
genuine lack of knowledge or little interest in cooperating with this process, many
inmates do not respond to many items on the survey. The largest response rates are
associated with less personal types of inquiries and items of a more immediate concern
such as sentence length, race, and education. Self reported assessments of guilt and
treatment by prison staff may be susceptible to misrepresentations, however self
identified sentence length, race, and education are more likely to reflect an accurate
measure.
Dependent Variable
Respondents were asked: How long is the sentence to prison for (controlling
offenses – the offense that brought you to prison at the current time )? Including any
suspended time (see U.S. Department of Justice, 2007). Their response, length of
sentence in years, represents the dependent variable.
To ensure state prisoners sampled did not come from all low-level security or all
high-level security facilities (thereby making the average sentence possibly higher or
lower for certain states), minimums and maximums were examined within each state.
Most states had a lower limit of 1, 2 or 3 years and all states had upper limits in excess of
10 years. Of the four states with lower limits in excess of 3 years, two (Montana and
Kentucky) had a minimum of 4 years; the other two (Oregon and Iowa) had minimums of
5 years. Since the lower bound on the range of sentence lengths for most states is 3 or
less and the maximums exceed 10, the sampling scheme most likely took into
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consideration varying levels of facility security. (Note: Of interest in Oregon and Iowa is
their apparent preference for sentencing in multiples of 5—in Oregon the sentences are 5,
20 or 30; in Iowa the sentences are 5, 8, 10, 15 and 25.)
Independent Variables
Individual-level variables. Individual level variables were selected based on their
inclusion in previous modeling studies evaluating sentencing practices and conflicting
findings from these studies. Some research has found black offenders receive longer
sentences (Albonetti, 1997; Chiricos & Crawford, 1995; Spohn, 2000; Steffensmeier &
Demuth, 2000). Other research has found race to have no effect on sentencing (Kautt,
2002; Ulmer, 1997). Still other research suggests those of minority status receive shorter
sentences (see e.g., Peterson & Hagan, 1984). Clearly this issue has not been resolved
and inclusion of a race variable study may shed light on the true nature of the race effect.
Many studies have investigated the impact of economic factors on severity of
punishment (see e.g., Mears & Field, 2000). These findings have also been inconsistent.
In several studies poverty was not found to have a significant effect on sentence length
(Kautt, 2002; McCarthy, 1990; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004; Weidner & Frase, 2001), while
other studies found poverty to have a positive effect on rates of incarceration (Arvanites,
1992; Taggart & Winn, 1993). Respondents to the inmate survey reported monthly
income prior to incarceration, but the survey did not require them to differentiate between
that legally earned and that acquired from other enterprises. In some cases the income
reported greatly exceeded what one might expect of individuals without even a high
school diploma. To address these apparent inconsistencies in reported income, years of
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education is used a surrogate for income. Highest level of education achieved prior to
incarceration is also included in this multilevel model.
State-level measurements. State is the identification variable for this HLM model.
In the survey data there were no inmate responses from Wyoming or West Virginia
therefore neither of these states will be used in the model. The District of Columbia was
included, bringing the total sample size for state (identification variable) to forty-nine.
There are four variables included in the model to assess contextual effects on sentencing
practices within each state.
The punitive severity index (average PSI) is the ratio of lower-level crime to
violent crime reported in each state. The average PSI for the ten year period 1995-2004 is
used in this model. The PSI is a measure of the overall scope and scale of a state’s
interest in lower-level crime. For example, a PSI of 2.5 (a relatively low value) implies a
state makes ten lower-level crime arrests for every four violent crime arrests. A PSI of
36.3 (a relatively high PSI) implies a state makes 36 arrests of lower-level crime for
every one arrest for violent crime. The PSI provides a snapshot (across the ten year time
period) of the relative magnitude of minor crime in a state relative to major crime. This
index reveals an interesting aspect of state criminal justice practices and may be
significant in a model to predict sentence length.
The punitive progression index (PPI) is the average percent change in the PSI
over the ten year period 1994–2004. The PPI reflects the percent change in a state’s
handling of not so criminal acts compared to serious criminal acts from year to year
across this period of time. A large PPI indicates a state has experienced on average a
substantial increase in lower-level crimes arrests relative to violent crime arrests (violent
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crimes rates have tended to either remain the same or decrease in virtually every state)
over this ten year period. A number of states have a negative PPI; for these states this
value reflects an average decrease over the years in the rate of arrests for lower-level
crimes relative to violent crime arrests. The PPI varies across states and is included in the
multilevel model as a contextual variable. While the PSI (the ratio of lower-level crime
arrests to violent crime arrests) is a measure of the overall scope and scale of a state’s
interest in lower-level crime, the PPI captures the average change in states’ reliance on
arrests of lower-level crimes relative to violent crime arrests.
As stated earlier, the impact of race, in particular black, on correctional practices
has been inconclusive. By including the percent black of the total state population as a
contextual variable (one which the accused has no control over, an aspect of the state in
which the individual is sentenced), the interaction of state percent black (level 2) and the
individual minority status (level 1) can be examined.
The final state level contextual variable included in this multilevel model is a
binary variable to denote whether a particular state has its probation system under the
control of the state’s judiciary or the state’s executive branch. Incarceration rates are high
and rising (due to a certain extent from the number of failed probationers). Roughly onethird of all probationers are incarcerated for probation conditions violations, and there is
an ever increasing roster of individuals placed on probation with harsher conditions and
increasing lengths. Given all these factors, the axis of probation control may have an
effect on the length of sentences. The judiciary has the day to day operations to better
assess needs of the court system, while states that place the oversight of their probation
system within the executive branch may put the direct budget for probation in the hands
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of the governor and legislators. Under the executive branch control model, the judiciary
is given a budget and allowed to decide how funds are spent, thereby giving the executive
branch some, though indirect, control over probation systems. Under a judiciary branch
control model, the budget amount and decisions about how the funds are spent likely
rests within the judiciary. To date this probation system control variable has not been
studied for its effect on states’ correctional practices.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 shows variables, metrics, and descriptive statistics for variables in the
conceptual model.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable

M

SD

Min.

Max.

Description

12.23

13.72

1

99

Length of sentence in years

Black

0.42

0.49

0

1

Offender race: Black = 1,
Non-Black = 0

Education

10.76

2.42

0

16

0 = never attended school, 1
= 1st grade, 2 = 2nd grade,
…, 12 = high school
graduate, 13 = freshman in
college, …, 16 =
undergraduate degree

7.2%

9.1%

–6.7%

36.0%

Average rate of growth of
{(Lower-Level
Crime)/(Violent Crime)}
over 10 year period

Black Percent

11.26%

11.67%

0.5%

57.8%

Percent of Blacks living in
U.S. states in 2004

Probation Rate

1,817

1,129

637

6,565

2004 probation per 100,000
state residents

Type of Probation

0.69

0.47

0

1

Type of probation oversight:
Executive = 1, Judicial = 0

Average Punitive Severity
Index (Average PSI)

11.67

6.96

2.5

36.3

Dependent Variable
Sentence Length
Individual-level Variables

State-level Variables
Punitive Progression Index
(PPI)
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Average of {(Lower-Level
Crime)/(Violent Crime)}
over 10 year period

Note that for the two binary variables, Black and Type of Probation, the mean
values are just the proportion of Black offenders and proportion of the states with
executive oversight of probation, respectively. The standard deviations for these two
binary variables represent the average of the squared differences between each of the 0 or
1 data values and the respective sample proportions (means).
Procedure
All data used in the study are available on the internet. Two main sources exist for
obtaining corrections data: The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) (available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/) and the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social
Research (ICPSR) (available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/). The BJS
website was utilized for data extraction and development of the punitive indices; the
ICPSR website supplied the data for the multilevel model.
Under the Freedom of Information Act which allows for the disclosure of
information and documents controlled by the United States government, the BJS website,
a product of the United States Department of Justice, makes available data on crimes,
victims, correctional facilities, correctional employees, probation, parole, and courts and
sentencing. Most of the available data result from annual surveys and for many areas the
data availability begins in 1995, not all surveys are conducted every year, some may be
every three to five years while other types of data do not show any particular pattern with
regard to collection intervals. The website does not contain any requirements concerning
permission or terms of usage. Their homepage specifically states that data and other
information contained in the website are in the public domain and may be reproduced,
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published or otherwise used without the Department’s permission. There is a request that
the user of information or data from this source provide a citation where appropriate and
that doing so would be appreciated.
ICPSR is a data depository housed at the University of Michigan. Data available
from this source run the gamut from mental health to criminal justice. Their home page
states that they provide leadership and training in data access, curation, and methods of
analysis for the social science research community. The University of Michigan is well
known for summer programs in quantitative methods in social research offered. The
Survey of Inmates in State Correctional Facilities responses were obtained from this site
and used for the modeling in this study. While one can acquire parts of the total survey
using the BJS website, ICPSR pulls together all variables and all responses in a very user
friendly manner. One can specify the format for data downloading (SPSS or SAS) with
syntax and code provided to allow for importing of these very large data sets. In addition
to the data, an extensive guide to variables and data collection methods are provided in
what is labeled as a codebook.
Access to this website is restricted to participating universities and colleges. The
user is required to enter an email address that corresponds to a participating academic
institution and set a password. Prior to downloading data the user must agree, by virtue of
clicking on the appropriate icon, to a list of terms. The user must agree to maintain the
privacy of the research subject, to use the data solely for statistical analysis and report
only aggregated information. In addition, the user agrees not to redistribute the data
without permission and to reference the recommended bibliographic citations. These
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references appear in the reference list for this research study, many are Bureau of Justice
Statistics references.
Analytic Strategy
Because of the research questions and nested nature of the data, hierarchical linear
modeling was used for analyzing these data. HLM has disadvantages over ordinary least
squares modeling. HLM models are fragile and complicated and necessitate a priori
understanding of research hypotheses (Kautt, 2002). The intercepts and slopes in the level
one model become the outcome variable in the level two model and careful consideration
must be given to which variables to include in each level (Heck & Thomas, 2009). With
49 states to analyze, every level one variable could produce a different intercept and
slope. The complex effect of a large number of independent variables is obvious,
therefore this research study was limited to two level one variables (both extra-legal) and
four level two variables (all contextual).
Individual inmates are nested within the states that determined sentences, which is
likely to result in inmates sentenced within the same state to have a certain degree of
similarity. Using a single level of ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis, the residual
errors are likely to be correlated within states, thus violating an OLS assumption
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Variation in sentencing across states is of particular interest
and as such requires a different approach. Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) introduces
a unique random effect for each state level equation to take into account the problem of
correlated residual errors (Gellman & Hill, 2007). Additionally, if the effect of level one
characteristics varies across states (e.g., race, education level), regression coefficients in
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an OLS model will be heterogeneous; HLM can also address this problem (Raudenbush,
Bryk, Cheong, Congdon, & du Toit, 2004).
A single level analysis would ignore contextual information about the jurisdiction
that may be important to sentencing decisions. Multilevel models contain variables
measured at a minimum of two levels, with lower-level observations nested within higher
levels (Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998). HLM involves the formulation and testing of
hypotheses about how variables at one level affect relationships at another, allowing for
testing of individual and group effects on the dependent variable (Banerjee, Carlin, &
Gelfand, 2004; see also Heck & Thomas, 2009). Since the data were multilevel and the
research questions support construction and analysis of a multilevel model, HLM was
well suited for this research study. Full Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLF) was
utilized due to the asymptotically efficiencies of the estimates when the sample sizes are
large (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002, p. 52).
Before conducting the main multilevel model analysis, correlations among the
various state crime statistics (incarceration rate, probation rate, and various crime rates)
were examined. This was followed by the calculations for each state of the two punitive
indices, PSI and PPI, reflecting the overall magnitude of punitiveness and the change in
punitiveness over time, respectively.
The next step was constructing the hierarchical linear model. Error variance plays
a significant role in HLM and misestimates can occur when dependency among outcomes
within the same state are ignored. A unique random effect for each state was incorporated
in the model but the researcher must determine if each attribute has a nonrandom,
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random, or fixed effect across each organization, in this case each state (Raudenbush &
Bryk, 2002). This can only be accomplished after running multiple potential models.
The general form of this research study HLM model is as follows:

where

(Yij ) = β 0 j + β1 j ( X 1ij − X 1 ) + β 2 j X 2ij + rij

(1)

β 0 j = γ 00 + γ 01W1 +  + γ 0mWm + u0 j

(2)

β1 j = γ 10 + γ 11W1 +  + γ 1mWm + u1 j

(3)


β kj = γ k 0 + γ k 1W1 +  + γ kmWm + ukj

(4)

Equation (1) addressed the question: How do inmate characteristics (race and
level of education) affect the length of incarceration? In this equation the term

( X 1ij − X 1 ) represents the level of education for inmate i, centered on the average of all
states’ education levels, that is, grand mean centered. In this same equation, X 2ij
represents the race of inmate i from state j. Although grand mean centered introduces
estimation bias in the individual level effect because the coefficient is a weighted
combination of the between and within state effects, it allows easier assessment of state
level differences in sentencing by education (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). With a greater
emphasis on state differences with regard to the influence of education, grand mean
centering is chosen for this variable.
The strategy with regard to HLM was to examine the various influences of
individual and contextual (state level) factors on sentence lengths. As Ulmer and Johnson
(2004) succinctly describe, the first analysis was the unconditional model (one-way
random effects ANOVA), which provided a measure of the amount of variation occurring
at both levels of analysis. Information about the proportion of variation between versus
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within states provided by this model provided the baseline for evaluating subsequent,
more sophisticated models. The next model included the level one predictor variables
(random coefficients ANCOVA with individual level predictors). This second model
revealed the proportion of reduction in variance at each level (level one and level two)
that is due to both the race and level of education of the inmate.
The third model built on the second model and introduced the level two
explanatory variables (random coefficients ANCOVA models with level one and level
two covariates) and provided information about average differences in sentencing
practices across states. The final model estimated the cross level interactions within the
third model, that is, the interactions between level one and level two variables (random
coefficients ANCOVA models with cross level interactions). For example, the effect that
percent of blacks in the state population has on sentence length for a black inmate can be
examined.
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Chapter Four: Results
Preliminary Analyses
Of the 14,499 inmates surveyed, 3,121indicated they were incarcerated for
probation violations. Of those approximately one-third provided information about what
type of violation occurred. Roughly one-half of the violations were of the new crime
variety (running the gamut from traffic tickets to violent crimes) and the rest were for
technical violations (failure to pay a court imposed costs, missed meeting with probation
officer, etc,). The average sentence length for those violating probation with a new crime
was 8.55 years (sd = 9.93). The average sentence length for those violating probation
with a technical rule infraction was 6.12 years (sd = 5.54); the most common reason
stated for these technical rule infraction was failure to pay fees.
The HLM analysis used data from a 2004 inmate survey, the most recent
available. For this reason, the ten-year time series data collected for indices development
begins in 1995. Table 3 shows the aggregated U.S. data for the number of individuals on
probation, number of individuals in prison, number of violent crimes, number of lowlevel crimes, and the ratio of lower-level crimes to violent crimes (PSI) from 1995 to
2004.
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Table 3: U.S. Crime, Prison, and Probation, 1995-2004
Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

Violent
Crime
682,159
548,146
501,353
539,523
475,823
475,521
492,073
500,678
472,599
471,007

Lower-Level
Crime
3,460,731
3,367,647
3,269,761
3,500,399
3,167,875
3,203,645
3,234,112
3,456,026
3,447,311
3,659,243

Probation
3,077,861
3,164,996
3,296,513
3,670,441
3,779,922
3,826,209
3,931,731
4,024,067
4,120,012
4,143,792

Prison
1,078,542
1,127,528
1,176,564
1,224,469
1,287,172
1,316,333
1,330,007
1,367,547
1,390,279
1,421,345

PSI*
5.0732
6.1437
6.5219
6.4880
6.6577
6.7371
6.5724
6.9027
7.2944
7.7690

* Punitive Severity Index = (Lower-Level Crime)/(Violent Crime)

Since the values in Table 3 are absolute frequencies rather than per capita figures,
one might expect some (if not all) of these variables to be increasing over time due to the
population increase over the ten year period. Pairwise correlations and associated pvalues for these five variables are shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Pairwise Pearson Correlation Coefficients (p-values) for U.S. Crime, Prison,
and Probation, 1995-2004
Violent
Lower-Level
Average
Crime
Crime
Probation
Prison
PSI*
Violent Crime

1.00

Lower-Level
Crime

.22
(.5401)

1.00

Probation

–.76
(.0114)

.18
(.6119)

1.00

Prison

–.80
(.0056)

.17
(.6292)

.99
(<.0001)

1.00

Average PSI*

–.89
(.0006)

.24
(.4984)

.86
(.0015)

.90
(.0004)

* PSI = Punitive Severity Index = (Lower-Level Crime)/(Violent Crime)
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1.00

Lower-level crime was not significantly related to any of the other variables.
Violent crime was significantly associated with probation, prison, and average PSI; in all
three cases these correlations were negative (r = –.76, r = –.80, and r = –.89,
respectively). The relationship between probation and PSI was significant and positive (r
= .86, p = .0015). The strongest correlation was found between incarceration (prison) and
probation (r =.99, p < .0001). In addition, incarceration was significantly positively
related to PSI (r = .90, p = .0004). The ratio of lower-level crimes to violent crimes was
associated with the increase in incarceration experienced by the U.S. over this ten year
period. The variation in PSI explained 81.1% of the variation in incarceration; the
variation in probation explained 97.6% of the variation in incarceration. Taken together
in a regression model to predict incarceration rates, probation and PSI accounted for
98.6% of the variation in incarceration.
Indices
To best capture the states’ downward defining of crime, the number of lowerlevel crimes (disturbing the peace, jaywalking, public drunkenness, etc.) was compared to
the number of violent crimes (rape, attempted murder, murder, assault, etc.) via a ratio.
The punitive severity index (PSI) was defined to be the ratio of lower-level crimes to
violent crimes. Since per capita data were used, no adjustments need to be considered for
any increases (or decreases) in the states’ populations. In any given year, a state might
expect this ratio to vary some from the prior year. By considering a ten year period, an
index can be developed which reflects a trend towards or away from the downward
defining of crime. The punitive progression index (PPI) is defined to be the average
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yearly percent change in the PSI (ratio of lower-level crime to violent crime) over ten
years. The PPI for a ten-year period is given by:
10
( PSI t − PSI t −1 ) 
1 
PPI = × 

9  t =2
PSI t −1


∑

where PSI t is the PSI value in year t, for t = 1, 2, …, 10.
Lower-level and violent crime trends for each state were plotted to determine if
any relationships were apparent. For most states the violent crimes per capita decreased
over time and the lower-level crimes steadily increased. There were however exceptions.
Figures 1 through 8 show trends of lower-level and violent crimes, as well as the punitive
severity index (PSI), for selected states. New Jersey and Arizona were chosen due to the
typical trends exhibited for lower-level and violent crimes, Delaware was selected to
illustrate parallel growth in these two types of crimes, and Illinois serves as an example in
which the national trend (of expanding the definition of crime) is reversed.

Figure 1. New Jersey Crime, 1995-2004

Figure 2. New Jersey PSI, 1995-2004
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Figure 4. Arizona PSI, 1995-2004

Figure 3. Arizona Crime, 1995-2004
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Figure 5. Delaware Crime, 1995-2004
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Figure 6. Delaware PSI, 1995-2004
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Figure 8. Illinois PSI, 1996-2004

Figure 7. Illinois Crime, 1996-2004
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The ratio of lower-level crimes to violent crimes (PSI) for each state were
calculated for the period 1995-2004. With these ten observations per state, the percentage
change in PSI from each prior year was calculated, resulting in nine values per state. The
average of these nine percentage changes for each state was obtained to produce the
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punitive progression index, PPI, for each state. Table 5 shows these values for the fifty
states plus the District of Columbia.
Table 5. Punitive Progression Index for the 50 States and District of Columbia
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
D.C.1
Florida1
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois1
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas1

PPI
11.6%
4.2%
7.7%
2.6%
2.6%
9.8%
0.1%
-1.7%
-0.5%
9.1%
14.7%
0.8%
4.7%
-4.8%
2.2%
5.9%
-4.2%

State
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine1
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana1
Nebraska
Nevada1
New Hampshire1
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina

PPI
24.1%
6.9%
-0.6%
36.0%
13.0%
20.3%
4.2%
10.4%
-1.9%
7.4%
3.1%
15.5%
3.6%
6.3%
1.1%
0.8%
3.6%

State
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma1
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont1
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin1
Wyoming

PPI
5.6%
5.8%
-3.1%
0.0%
27.1%
14.4%
25.3%
11.1%
3.6%
3.4%
5.9%
-6.7%
5.5%
1.3%
22.0%
24.8%
2.2%

1. At least one year of missing data.

From these same ratios an average ratio of lower-level crimes to violent crimes
was calculated to reflect, in absolute terms, the average approach a given state has had
with regard to lower-level crimes versus violent crimes during this ten year period. The
resulting average punitive severity index measures in a more general sense how punitive
a state is with regard to its citizens. Table 6 provides the average PSI for the fifty states
and the District of Columbia and type of probation oversight.

63

Table 6. Average PSI and Probation Oversight Type for the 50 States and District of
Columbia
State
Alabama1
Alaska1
Arizona
Arkansas1
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware1
D.C. 1,2
Florida1,2
Georgia1
Hawaii
Idaho1
Illinois2
Indiana
Iowa1
Kansas2

PSI
9.5
10.3
16.2
9.9
2.5
14.7
10.3
4.1
30.0
6.5
7.2
20.4
20.6
6.6
6.1
7.0
12.3

State
Kentucky1
Louisiana1
Maine1,2
Maryland1
Massachusetts
Michigan1
Minnesota
Mississippi1
Missouri1
Montana1,2
Nebraska
Nevada1,2
New Hampshire1,2
New Jersey
New Mexico1
New York1
North Carolina1

PSI
5.9
7.7
22.0
9.4
2.9
7.8
10.1
15.1
9.7
8.3
17.6
13.1
23.5
8.4
12.7
7.0
6.1

State
North Dakota1
Ohio
Oklahoma1,2
Oregon1
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island1
South Carolina1
South Dakota1
Tennessee
Texas1
Utah1
Vermont1,2
Virginia1
Washington1
West Virginia
Wisconsin1,2
Wyoming1

PSI
36.3
9.8
5.9
7.5
4.3
10.9
5.1
15.9
6.1
9.9
19.7
10.9
12.7
8.4
7.1
21.5
21.4

1. Executive branch probation system oversight. If not 1, some or all judicial branch oversight.
2. At least one year of missing data.

Both the PPI and the Average PSI were included in the HLM model. These
indices were not significantly correlated (r = –.15, p = .304). Both of these indices reflect
the degree to which a state exercises its power of lower-level crime prosecution relative
to violent crime prosecution, providing a degree of face validity evidence. Once
incorporated in the multilevel model, convergent validity can be addressed. If states are
directing punitive attention towards increasing prosecution of lower-level crimes, an
inverse relationship should be revealed between length of sentence and the punitiveness
indices.
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A Hierarchical Linear Model
Null Model
Before developing the full multilevel model, the variation in sentence length that
lies within and between each level of the two level model was calculated. This was
achieved through specifying a one-way ANOVA with a random-effect model (Gelman &
Hill 2009; Heck & Thomas 2009; Raudenbush et al., 2004), commonly referred to as the
null model. This null model provides important information that guides later decisions
concerning multilevel modeling, specifically, whether a multilevel approach to the data is
appropriate or not. Table 7 shows the null model results.
Table 7: Null Model (Case-level n = 4,798; State-level n = 49 )
Random Effect
Intercept
Level 1

Variance
Component
15.436
170.146

df

Chi-Square

p-value

48

507.119

<.001

Intraclass correlation (15.436/185.582) = .0832.
Deviance = 38,261.54 (Number of estimated parameter = 2)

Using the variance components, a measure of the dependence of inmate sentence
length on state was calculated. From the Final estimation of variance components section
produced from the HLM software package Scientific Software International HLM 6, an
intraclass correlation (ICC) was calculated. This ICC, a measure of the within-state
dependency of sentence length, was .0832. Approximately 8% of the variation in
sentence length was associated with the state. This is not a particularly large value; it is
however sufficient to suggest multilevel modeling is an appropriate alternative to single
level modeling (OLS). The ICC ranges from zero to one, measuring how strong units in
the same group resemble each other and values below .05 are considered insufficient to
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support multilevel modeling (Gelman & Hill 2009; Heck & Thomas 2009). The
significance of the ICC is determined using a chi-square test with j–1 degrees of freedom.
The observed chi-square of 507.12 (p < .001) refutes the hypothesis that mean sentence
length for males in the sample is equal across all states. The average length of sentence
for all males in the sample across all states was 11.97 years.
A measure of the reliability of the sample mean for any state as an estimate of the
population mean is evaluated from the variance component section of the HLM output
which incorporated the sample sizes for each state. The summary measure (with a range
between zero and one) of these within-state reliabilities was λ = .709 for this model. With
a significant ICC suggesting a difference in sentence length by state, and a relatively high
reliability (λ = .709), suggesting that the sample data provides a real difference in
sentence length by state, multilevel modeling was appropriate for these data.
Level 1 Model
The next step in the analysis is to develop the level 1 model. Guided by prior
research results, two level 1 variables were considered for inclusion in the level 1 model:
the race of the inmate (Black or Non-Black) and the level of education. The goal in this
study was to use multilevel modeling to is determining the correct specification of the
theoretical model—both of these level 1 variables were to be retained in the model even
if efficiency of the prediction suggested removal.
Testing the relationships between sentence length and race and level of education
for significance, the unconditional model was specified with the education grand mean
centered to allow for a useful interpretation of the intercept, which became the outcome
variable in level 2 of this model. This intercept is interpreted as the adjusted mean for
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group j, specifically the outcome for an inmate whose education level is equal to the
average education of all inmates across all states. Table 8 shows the unconditional model
results.
Table 8: Level 1 Model (Case-level n = 4,798; State-level n = 49)
Fixed Effect

Coefficient

Std Error

t Ratio

df

Constant
Race
Education

11.335
1.597
0.003

0.676
1.042
0.028

16.759
1.533
0.103

48
4,785
4,785

Random Effect

Variance Component

df

Chi-Square

p-value

48

504.500

<.001

Intercept
Level 1

15.284
169.678

p-value
<.001
.125
.918

Intraclass correlation (15.284/184.962) = .0826
Deviance = 38,251.00 (Number of estimated parameters = 2)

The average sentence length, adjusted for Race and Education is 11.36 years
(approximately .61 years lower than the average of the grand mean of 11.97 years). This
is the average sentence length of each state after adjusting for the level 1 variables in the
model.
After this adjustment for level 1 variables, significant variance in mean sentence
length by state continued to be present (χ2 = 504.5, p < .001). Comparing the
unconditional model intraclass correlation of .0826 with that of the null-model (r =
.0832) suggests very little of the variance in state average sentences is accounted for by
race and education level of the inmate. Testing the statistical significance of level 1
parameters reveals mean sentence length does not vary by education level but may vary
by race. For black inmates the predicted sentence length was 1.59 years longer (p = .125).
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Of interest in this research paper is the relationship between race and sentence
length and if this relationship varies from state to state. The model to test this includes
level 1 random intercepts and slopes. Table 9 shows the results for this model.
Table 9: Random Intercept and Slope Model
(Case-level n = 4,798; State-level n = 49)
Fixed Effect

Coefficient

Std Error

t Ratio

df

p-value

0.639
0.588
0.029

18.157
1.520
–0.067

48
4,785
4,785

<.001
.135
.947

df

Chi-Square

p-value

38
38

243.122
72.730

<.001
.001

Constant
Race
Education

11.597
0.894
–0.002

Random Effect

Variance Component

Intercept
Race
Level 1

12.982
4.044
168.415

The results suggests a significant variation in the intercept from state to state for
average sentence length (χ2 = 243.12, p < .001). In addition, the slope for race varied
significantly from state to state (χ2 = 72.73, p < .001). Thus, the relationship between
sentence length and race is not the same across states.
The purpose of the next and final model was to identify state variables that might
explain the significant variation in sentence length by state established in the prior
models. For this model, level 1 variables must be specified as either fixed or random
across each level 2 equation (Kautt, 2002). As a general rule, level 1 variables not found
significant in preliminary analyses (unconditional model) should be modeled as having a
fixed effect (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Education was modeled as fixed while race,
with a stronger indication of usefulness (p = .125) was modeled as random though
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nonsignificant, allowing the impact of an individual’s race on sentence length to vary
across states. Table 10 shows the results for this final model.
Table 10: Level 2 Intercept and Slope as Outcomes Model
(Case-level n = 4,798, State-level n = 49)
Fixed Effect

Coefficient

Std Error

t Ratio

df

p-value

Constant
Probation Type
Percent Black
PPI
PSI
Race
Education

8.967
3.808
0.058
–0.007
0.042
0.784
–0.003

1.814
1.319
0.062
0.003
0.110
0.583
0.029

4.942
2.887
0.928
–2.661
0.387
1.344
–0.120

44
44
44
44
44
48
4,781

.000
.006
.359
.011
.700
.186
.905

Random Effect

Variance Component

df

ChiSquare

p-value

12.335
4.377
168.283

34
38

180.031
73.803

Intercept
Race
Level 1

.000
.001

Deviance = 38,229.26 (Number of estimated parameters = 4)
Deviance = 38,229.26 (Number of estimated parameters = 4)

Probation type (p = .006) and PPI (p = .011) appear to be useful in the multilevel
model while percent black and PSI do not (p = .359 and p = .700, respectively). In the
presence of the level 2 variables, race is not particularly useful (p = .186) and education
(p = .905) continues to add little value in explaining variation in inmate sentence length.
While substantial variation in parameter estimates exists across states in the final
model, the chi-square values associated with the variance component for the random
intercept have been reduced from χ2 = 243.122 in the random intercept and slope model
to χ2 = 180.031 in the intercepts and slopes and outcomes model. No such reduction in
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the chi-square statistic is found with regard to the random race slope; indeed the value
increased slightly in the final model (χ2 = 72.73 versus χ2 = 73.801).
The proportional reduction of error measure, similar to the coefficient of
determination in OLS, is calculated by subtracting the sum of the variance components in
the final model from the sum of the variance components in the null model and dividing
this value by the sum of the variance components in the null model. From the first model
to the last model, the decrease in variance component of sentence length is approximately
3% of the original unexplained variance in sentence length—not particularly noteworthy.
On the other hand, the hypothesis test for the deviance differences in these two models
(i.e., the multivariate test of variance-covariance components specification) supports a
finding that the final model represents a significant improvement over the first model (χ2
= 1368.79, p < .001). All assumptions were checked and no significant departures noted.
Research Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: U.S. probation rates will explain a significant proportion of the
variation in incarceration rates and will be a better predictor of incarceration rates than
other corrections-related variables including various crime rates.
Probation provides a fast track to incarceration for approximately one in three
probationers. Those violating probation are just as likely to have done so due to a
technical violation as a new crime. Such technical violations can run the gamut from
insufficient funds to pay court-imposed fees to absences from court ordered treatment
classes to failure to check in with the probation officers at the appointed times. Most
technical violations are for financial reasons. Additionally, probationers tend to be those
originally charged with lower-level crimes, which is why probation rate and the ratio of
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lower-level crimes to violent crimes are so highly and positively correlated. An
expansion of lower-level crimes will provide new “criminals” to feed the criminal justice
industrial complex in both the supervision business and the incarceration business.
Researchers have established that longer probation sentences are associated with greater
likelihood of unsuccessful completion (with the concomitant increase in incarceration)
and that probation sentence lengths, as well as the number and punitiveness of conditions
of probation, have been increasing. This combination virtually ensures the continued
expansion of the states’ corrections reach and power over its citizens. The data strongly
support Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2: Both the education level (as a surrogate measure for socioeconomic
level) and race of the incarcerated will be significant level 1 predictors of sentence
length.
Education was utilized as a surrogate measure for socio-economic level. The only
other measure available that may have provided insight into the inmates’ socio-economic
level was income. However, many questionably high incomes were reported for
individuals with exceedingly low levels of education, thus rendering income reported
potentially inaccurate. Another concern with the use of education as a predictor variable
is the nature of the data itself. While used in this model as a continuous variable, the
difference between a second and third grader may not be the same as the difference
between a ninth and tenth grader. Nonetheless, education was not significant to the model
for predicting sentence length.
Race, specifically in this study black or not black, appears to be somewhat useful
though nonsignificant (p = .125) in explaining the variation in sentence length. This
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partially supportive finding tends to confirm the mixed results of research to date—some
researchers have found black offenders are treated differently from all other races when
sentenced to prison while others have not found differential treatment. Forty-three
percent of all respondents in the 2004 inmate survey are black, much greater that the U.S.
population percent black for the same year, 12.4%. Clearly race makes a difference, but
length of sentence does not address it. Hypothesis 2 is not supported by the data.
Hypothesis 3: The ten-year growth in the ratio of lower-level to violent crimes
(the punitive progression index), the ten-year average ratio of lower-level crime to violent
crime (ten-year average punitive severity index), the type of probation (executive or
judicial oversight), and percent of blacks in the state will be significant level 2 predictors
of states’ incarceration sentencing lengths.
The PPI (punitive progression index) represents a trend either towards or away
from punitiveness as measured by the level of enforcement of lower-level criminal
violations to violent criminal violations for each state. This index is useful in explaining
the variation in average length of sentence by state (p = .011). The PPI coefficient of –
0.007 implies that as this index increases sentence length decreases. It could be said that
those states with lower PPIs value the ‘quality’ of the arrest while states with higher PPIs
emphasize quantity over quality.
The ten-year average PSI (punitive severity index) is not useful as a level 2
predictor (p = .700). This result is surprising in light of the high positive correlation
between the PSI and incarceration rates for the aggregated U.S. data (r = .90, p = .0004).
Since the ratio of these two types of law enforcement activities (arrests for lower-level
crime and arrests for violent crime) suggests a certain corrections philosophy on the part
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of elected officials, it should logically be associated with average sentence length by
state. One possible explanation may be that in terms of sentence length, trends matter
more than ratios and there may be a lag factor that is accounted for by trending the
indices. Additionally, PSI is not compared to the national average and perhaps a norming
of each state’s value relative to the national PSI would have been useful in the model.
Percent black is not a good level 2 predictor (p = .359). With a disproportionate
percent of blacks incarcerated relative to the population percent of blacks, one theory
suggests elected officials would be less inclined to sentence any individual (black or not)
to long periods of incarceration in states with a large black population; this theory is not
supported by the data. Additionally, there is no significant relationship between either
PPI or PSI and percent black, further refuting the theory that large black population states
apply justice in a different manner than other states.
Finally, type of probation oversight, executive versus judicial, appears to be a
useful level 2 predictor in explaining variation in average sentence length by state (p =
.006). Those states with at least some judicial oversight of the probation process have
significantly lower average sentence length than states that have only executive oversight.
With probation rates highly correlated with incarceration rates we know the number of
individuals on probation is a good predictor of the number of individuals incarcerated. A
difference in probation administration appears to be associated with a difference in length
of incarceration. One possible explanation is that when the judicial branch oversees the
probation process, politics are less involved. Another reason may be associated with
judges’ involvement in the day-to-day process of administering justice since they can see
first-hand what does and does not work. Perhaps this makes them less inclined to
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sentence residents to extended time in prison than elected policy-makers might prefer.
Additionally, if oversight includes control of a budget, judges may be disinclined to
spend limited funds on incarceration as a justice device, but if funds are controlled by the
executive branch, concerns about the cost of incarceration may not factor into decisions
about sentence lengths. The data support two of the four variable association theories in
Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 4: The ratio of the number of lesser crimes to the number of more
serious crimes will be significantly correlated with both probation and incarceration rates,
and significant in a model to predict incarceration in the presence of probation.
When considering which variables might be associated with incarceration rates
many come to mind. Perhaps the most obvious and likely is crime rate. Rates of crime,
however, do not adequately predict incarceration rates. This is true whether one considers
violent crime or lower-level crime. If states’ are locking up their citizens to make their
states safer places to live, logic dictates crime would be positively associated with levels
of incarceration; it is not. Even with one, two and three year lag times for incarceration to
catch up to crimes, no improvement in strength of the correlations is found.
If U.S. citizens are becoming more inclined towards criminal activities, one would
expect levels of all crimes to increase and this increase should be associated with an
increase in incarceration rates. There are four large categories of reported crimes
accounting for over 90% of all crimes—violent crime, property crime, drug crime, and
lower-level crimes. Both violent crime and property crime have been declining while
drug crime and lower-level crime have been increasing. Drug crimes are unlikely to be a
significant factor in probation level increases since the minimum sentencing guidelines,
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in effect during the period 1995-2004, required jail time for most offenses. If the
incarceration rates do not reflect either more dangerous citizens or safer states, what is
the source of the substantial increases in incarceration rates across the U.S.? Probation
appears to be a very good predictor of incarceration as does the ratio of lower-level crime
to violent crime (PSI). When both of these variables are in a regression model to predict
incarceration rates, 98.6% of the variation in U.S. incarceration rates from 1995 to 2004
can be accounted for by the variation in probation rates and PSI. The data strongly
support Hypothesis 4.
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Chapter Five: Discussion and Conclusions
Summary
Indices
Why is the U.S. locking up so many of its citizens? If the population as a whole is
becoming more criminal one would expect substantive crime to be increasing, but it is
not. Indeed the most violent types of crime have been on a downward trend for more than
twenty years. In the hierarchy of criminal acts, the most harmful types have shown a
steady decline while the least harmful (some argue harmless) types have been increasing.
Looking at aggregated U.S. data, probation rates are an excellent predictor of
incarceration rates. The index developed herein to capture the trend towards more
inclusive defining of crime, PPI, is also an important predictor of incarceration rates. The
most common outcome for those charged with lower-level crimes is probation, a
punishment that represents a delayed entry into the prison system for approximately onethird of all participants. With the surge in probation, a surge in incarceration is bound to
occur.
HLM
Since states differ on the average amount of time they sentence their citizens for
crimes, multilevel modeling has the potential to explain some of the variation in sentence
length. Neither an individual’s level of education (p = .918) nor race (p = .125) appear to
be a good predictors of sentence. Of the contextual variables considered, PPI and type of
76

probation system were significant (p = .001 and p = .006, respectively). Those states with
executive branch oversight of the probation system had significantly higher average
sentence lengths (13.29 years, sd = 4.81) for inmates than the states with judicial branch
oversight (8.89 years, sd =4.14). The estimated coefficient for PPI was negative—which
is what is expected if PPI is a valid measure of movement towards or away from
punitiveness. States with higher PPI’s are incarcerating lower-level criminals at a greater
rate relative to violent criminals; the sentence length for lower-level crimes are shorter
than those for not so lower-level crimes.
Implications for Research and Policy
A better understanding of the operations of judicial oversight probation systems
compared to executive oversight is needed as this variable is significant in explaining
some of the variation in average sentence length by state. Which aspects are similar and
which are different? How do the outcomes differ for the two types and what does that
mean for the state budgets? Additionally, it would be interesting to find out if the
decision whether or not to incarcerate differs by probation oversight, at least with respect
to probation violations.
PPI was trended over a ten-year period and found to be useful in explaining some
of the variation in average sentence length by state. More work needs to done regarding
issues of validity and reliability. In addition, this measure could be calculated for a longer
or shorter period. Future research may reveal the versatility of the index. State policy
makers may utilize this index for inclusion in a developed model to determine ways to
meet budget constraints. With many years of data, a PPI which optimizes states’ interests
could be developed to inform corrections practices. A more precise analysis might be
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obtained by using county level data for purposes of PPI and PSI and modeling these to
predict sentence length by county. This would require a tremendous though useful data
collection effort as each state has unique reporting systems.
For those concerned with the ever-increasing rate of incarceration in the U.S.,
identifying variables that may be associated with length of sentence represents an
important step towards reversing the trends. For state-level decision makers, a better
understanding of how states’ got to their high levels of incarceration may provide the
means to begin a reduction. With the politicians’ push to surpass opponents in the get
tough on crime positioning, a very expensive corrections system has evolved. When the
economy was robust and employment levels were high, states could support the fiscal
cost of the always increasing incarceration rates of its citizens while they might have
chosen to ignore the societal costs. Now states must choose among such expenditures as
education, medical care for the poor, and emergency services to decide where to make the
cuts if they wish to continue the race to incarcerate.
Increased levels of incarceration are not associated with crime rates as the public
has been led to believe. Swept up in the tough on crime frenzy are law-abiding citizens
that find themselves astonished to be ‘new criminals’—such was the case for Professor
Gates. To ratchet down the corrections system will certainly require a careful look at
probation, and that will lead policy makers to examine the surge in the number of citizens
charged with lower-level crimes. If the U.S. continues to drive into the corrections system
1 in every 31 citizens, a tipping point will be reached where the population of those with
experience on the wrong side of the corrections system (and their friends and family) will
outnumber those without such experience—it is anyone’s guess what might happen then.
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Limitations
The corrections data for each state (probation, incarceration, parole, number of
crimes by type, etc.) are provided by the various state reporting agencies to the Federal
Bureau of Justice Statistics. These data are assumed to be measured without error. This
assumption is reasonable in light of the public scrutiny such reports bring. If there is error
in measuring, this error is unlikely to be biased towards under- or over-reporting.
This research study relies on data collected by others, a reasonable reliance with
regard to the state agencies but perhaps problematic for the inmate survey data.
Whenever a researcher does not control all phases of survey design and collection,
assumptions made about the appropriateness of the sampling method and data collection
may be dubious. For example, the kind of environment in which the face-to-face
interviews were conducted could have played a significant role in the response rates and
possibly the actual responses to some of the survey items. No information is available
about the particular environment and whether or not the setting was the same for each
correctional institution. The assumption that all variables are measured without error may
be violated with regard to the inmate survey.
Regarding the developed indices (PSI and PPI), there is preliminary evidence to
suggest validity as other variables behave in expected ways with respect to the indices.
However, in the absence of further work in the area of validation, these indices should be
viewed as reasonable for inclusion in the model but caution should be used with
interpretations. Additionally, PPI was calculated over a ten year period and calculation
over adjacent years may be of greater interest. Looking at state activity on a more micro
level may be useful for validation purposes. Counties vary in the severity with which they
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respond to infractions, harsher responses are de facto increased punitiveness. County
level PSIs and PPIs should be correlated with differing levels of county correction
responses to similar crimes.
With respect to the variables chosen for inclusion in the multilevel model, it
cannot be said that all known relevant variables are included. The reality is inmates are
not very forthcoming when answering many of the questions posed to them, resulting in
very low response rates. Some variables that might have been relevant in explaining the
variation in sentence length are simply unavailable. Nonetheless, the self-reported
variables chosen for inclusion in the model (sentence length, race and education) have
very few missing responses (< 2%), perhaps indicating a certain degree of honesty on the
part of the inmates for these variables and a willingness or even desire to have these facts
about them known.
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